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MODIFIED UNIVERSALISMS & THE ROLE OF LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE 
IN THE MAKING OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW  
 
ADRIAN WALTERS* 
 
Cross-border insolvency law scholars have devoted much attention to theoretical 
questions of international system design. There is a general consensus in the literature 
that the ideal system would be a universalist system in which cross-border insolvencies 
would be administered in a single forum under a single governing law But scholars have 
paid less systematic attention to how a universalist system can be implemented in the real 
world by institutional actors such as legislatures and judges. This article seeks to redress 
the balance by discussing the reception of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency in the United States and the United Kingdom and exploring the role that 
judges play in harmonizing cross-border insolvency law.  
 
As the Model Law is choice-of-law neutral, domestic enactments typically contain no 
express choice-of-law rules. Universalists urge judges to take their cue from modified 
universalism and interpret Model Law enactments in a manner that approximates to 
universalism’s ideal “one court, one law” approach. But comparative analysis of Anglo-
American judicial practice reveals that the contours of modified universalism are 
contested.   “Modified universalism” as it is understood in the United States implies that 
judges should presumptively defer to the law of the foreign insolvency proceeding (lex 
concursus). American universalists tend therefore to favor a strong, centralizing version 
of modified universalism. By contrast, British modified universalism has a forum law (lex 
fori) choice-of-law orientation. British modified universalism supports effective 
coordination of insolvency proceedings with one court having a primary coordinating 
role. But it lacks any commitment to a centralizing lex concursus rule in the absence of 
statutory mandate.   
 
Framed by reference to this account of the Model Law’s Anglo-American reception, the 
article argues that modified universalism offers no convincing theory of how a 
universalist system is to be institutionalized in practice in the absence of more and harder 
law, the province of legislatures. Competing versions of modified universalism cannot 
support an interpretive methodology capable of yielding global judge-made rules of 
private international law that would address the Model Law’s choice-of-law 
indeterminacy.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Cross-border insolvencies generate obvious coordination and governance 
difficulties. The basic problem – the presence of assets, claims, and creditors in more 
than one jurisdiction − is magnified by the prevalence of complex, multinational 
enterprises operating through multinational corporate group structures constituted 
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according to the laws of numerous jurisdictions, onshore and offshore. Private 
international law unification instruments 1  and other soft harmonization initiatives 
designed to nurture convergence among national insolvency laws2 and cooperation in 
cross-border insolvency cases have emerged to address these difficulties.3  A leading 
private international law instrument – the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (“the Model Law”)4 – marked its twentieth anniversary in 2017. Supporters 
hail the Model Law as an embodiment of “modified universalism” that provides a 
foretaste of a fully universalist system for fair and efficient administration of cross-border 
insolvencies in a single forum under a single law.5 On the theoretical plane, universalist 
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interchangeably. In the US “bankruptcy” cases can affect both individuals and legal entities. In other 
countries, such as the UK, “bankruptcy” refers only to individuals and does not include entities, whereas 
“insolvency” is all embracing. 
1 Of which the two leading examples are Regulation (EU) No. 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of 
fthe Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast), 2015 O.J. (L. 141/19) [hereinafter EU 
INSOLVENCY REGULATION] (revising and recasting Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 
2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L. 60/1)) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency, infra note 4.  
2 See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW,  
PARTS 1 & 2 (2004), PART 3 (2010), PART 4 (2013), 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html.            
3 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL 
INSOLVENCY: GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES 
(2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL PRINCIPLES]. 
4 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY (1997) WITH 
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT (revised 2013), U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1999) [hereinafter MODEL LAW & 
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT]. 
5 See Jay L. Westbrook, National Regulation of Multinational Default, in ECONOMIC LAW AND JUSTICE 
IN TIMES OF GLOBALISATION 777, 779 (Mario Monti et al eds., 2007) [hereinafter Westbrook, National 
Regulation] (the Model Law “tacitly adopted the approach of modified universalism”); infra Section I.B. 
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scholars have claimed victory. 6   But despite universalism’s theoretically triumphant 
template for a market symmetric, welfare maximizing international insolvency system, 
universalists have no convincing account of how their system can be institutionalized in 
practice without a comprehensive insolvency convention or global courts and centralized 
enforcement mechanisms. 
Universalism’s ambitions are grand. Yet its methods are pragmatic and realistic.7 
Universalists recognize that global conventions are hard to accomplish8 and that a world 
government will not be established any time soon. They accept that the vision of “one 
forum, one law” can only be realized in baby steps. Methodologically, they favor slow 
burning techniques – at the international level, legislative incrementalism designed to 
create conditions for more intensive interstate cooperation over time;9 at the domestic 
level, purpose oriented judicial interpretive practice embracing comity and fidelity to 
international system building.10 They deploy modified universalism both as a theory to 
                                                        
6 See John Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs and Toward Reliance: A Normative Framework for Cross-Border 
Insolvency Choice of Law, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 202, 202 (2014) [hereinafter Pottow, 
Beyond Carve Outs] (“And it has been settled. The universalists, at least as a normative matter, appear to 
have won.”).  
7 See Jay L. Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 716 (2005) [hereinafter Westbrook, 
Chapter 15 at Last] (“Universalism is now characterized as modified universalism, meaning a pragmatic 
approach that seeks to move steadily toward the ideal of universal proceedings while accepting the reality 
of step-by-step progress through cooperation.”). 
8 See Westbrook, National Regulation, supra note 5, 778-79 (“The ideal of universalism is of a single 
primary bankruptcy proceeding in the debtor’s home country, with courts elsewhere acting in an ancillary 
or supportive role to the primary court, resulting in unitary administration of assets under one bankruptcy 
law. Because that result would require sophisticated international agreements, the ideal remains some 
distance away”). 
9 See John Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L. L. 
935 (2005) [hereinafter Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism]. On the role of incrementalism in international 
lawmaking generally see also Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global 
Lawmaking, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 851 (2007) [hereinafter Block-Lieb and Halliday, Incrementalisms]; 
Less is More in International Private Law, 3 NOTT. INSOLV. & BUS. L. e-J. 43 (2015), 
https://www4.ntu.ac.uk/nls/document_uploads/174815.pdf  [hereinafter Block-Lieb & Halliday, Less is 
More]. Block-Lieb and Halliday focus on how international law is made and develops. They do not pursue 
an explicitly universalist agenda. 
10 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art.8; Jay L. Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, 87 TEMP. L. 
REV. 739 (2015) [hereinafter Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale].  
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undergird a transitional system sensitive to the interests of sovereign states and local 
stakeholders pending the establishment of a fully universalist system, and as a 
normatively laden method or principle that, applied correctly, will help bring about a 
fully universalist system. Modified universalism as method has an ideological and 
teleological quality − domestic courts should “cooperate to achieve a result as close to the 
ideal as circumstances and existing domestic law permit.”11 This approximation of the 
“real” to the “ideal”, or the present state to the desirable end state, resembles how 
classical economists have historically justified government intervention in real markets 
using the concept of a perfect market, operating under conditions of perfect competition, 
as a guide to policy and practice.12 
In their implicit commitment to global free markets, universalists naturally 
assume that the job of international commercial law is to create frictionless and 
transcendent international legal frameworks that facilitate efficient allocation of global 
capital by increasing predictability and reducing transaction costs ex ante (when credit is 
extended) and ex post (when debtors default). But as deglobalization takes hold in the 
post-2008 world, notably in the West, global markets and free trade are increasingly 
                                                        
11 See Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2301 (2000) 
[hereinafter Westbrook, Global Solution]. See also Westbrook, National Regulation, supra note 5, 779. 
12 I confess here my own Burkean animus against the design and benchmarking of systems by reference to 
abstract desiderata and my preference instead for going forward from real world premises. See EDMUND 
BURKE, SPEECH ON REFORM OF REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS (1784), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Burke/brkSWv4c2.html  (“It seems to me a preposterous way of 
reasoning, and a perfect confusion of ideas, to take the theories, which learned and speculative men have 
made from…government, and then, supposing it made on these theories, which were made from it, to 
accuse government as not corresponding with them. I do not vilify theory and speculation…No; whenever I 
speak against theory, I mean always a weak, erroneous, fallacious, unfounded or imperfect theory; and one 
of the ways of discovering that it is a false theory is by comparing it with practice.”).  See also Ronald H. 
Coase, The Regulated Industries: A Discussion, 54 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 194, 195 (1964) 
(“Contemplation of an optimal system may suggest ways of improving the system…[and] it may go far to 
providing a solution. But in general its influence has been pernicious. It has directed…attention away from 
the main question, which is how alternative arrangements will actually work in practice.”). 
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under attack.13  And, thus, the prospects for universalism’s constitutive agenda – the 
establishment of worldwide insolvency infrastructure in support of global trading and 
credit markets – now seem highly contingent. Indeed, in the current global economic and 
geopolitical context, the mismatch between the scale of universalism’s theoretical 
ambitions and the gradualism of its practical working methods is striking.  
A journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step14 and the progress made 
to date in international insolvency cooperation cannot be underestimated. Meaningful and 
effective coordination involving courts and practitioners has led to successful multi-
jurisdictional resolutions in large, complex cross-border insolvency cases such as 
Maxwell, Lehman, and Nortel. International cooperation has proved possible 
notwithstanding feasibility constraints. But universalists have not convincingly 
demonstrated how progress will be made towards universalism other than in fits and 
starts. Go too fast and countries may push back. Go too incrementally and there is a risk 
of stasis – a system in a state of semi-permanent transition at best – akin to getting stuck 
part way up a hill.15  
My starting assumption is that universalists are right that a universalist system 
would be the best (or least worst) system we could devise to address the social cost 
                                                        
13 See, e.g. Globalisation: The Rise and Fall of an Idea that Swept the World, THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 14, 
2017; Management Theory is Becoming a Compendium of Dead Ideas, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2016; 
Risk of Deglobalization Hangs Over World Economy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2016. See also Frank J. Garcia, 
Introduction: Globalization, Power, States, and the Role of Law, 54 B.C.L. REV. 903, 904-5 (2013) 
(discussing how globalization has both weakened and strengthened states). 
14 Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 7, 716, fn.23. The proverb (or a variant thereof) is usually 
attributed to Lao-Tzu, the Chinese philosopher said to have been the founder of Taoism.  
15 A self-described “aggressive universalist” whose work unpacks modified universalism’s incremental 
methodology, acknowledges this risk. See Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs, supra note 6, 209 (“The glass half 
full narrative is that modest reforms will tear down sovereign mistrust and participant-actors’ skepticism of 
the evils of applying foreign insolvency law. The half empty narrative, however, is that these modest 
reforms will get readily enacted with self-congratulatory back-slapping but then stall without further 
progress when the truly difficult sovereignty concessions have to be made (e.g. selection of priority and 
distribution rules.)”). 
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problems that arise from cross-border insolvencies. My differences with leading 
universalists are methodological. In the present state of affairs, modified universalism can 
only beget universalism through the agency of various state and non-state actors: 
legislatures (international and domestic), courts, practitioners, and professional bodies 
(through the influence they exert as non-state actors in legislative processes and as 
providers of continuing professional development and know-how to their members). The 
roles these actors play, the incentives they have, and the constraints they face, in 
actualizing universalism in practice in the real world, demand attention. To date, there 
has been little systematic discussion of institutional actors in the legal literature on 
international insolvency. 16  The “universalism versus territorialism” debate in the 
academic literature operates at a high, theoretical level of generality and focuses on “blue 
skies” questions about what is the normatively appropriate model or system for governing 
cross-border insolvencies.17 The practitioner literature, often excellent at capturing case 
law developments and practice innovations,18 serves the “street” or micro-level needs of 
its primary audience. What we lack is an abundance of meso-level scholarship analyzing 
how the international insolvency system functions, having regard to the main actors 
                                                        
16 A notable exception is the work of Terry Halliday and Susan Block-Lieb on international legislatures and 
standard-setting. See, e.g. Block-Lieb & Halliday, Incrementalisms, supra note 9; Terrence C. Halliday,  
Josh Pacewicz & Susan Block-Lieb, Who Governs? Delegations in Global Trade Lawmaking, 7 REG. & 
GOVERNANCE 279 (2013); Susan Block-Lieb & Terrence C. Halliday, GLOBAL LAWMAKERS: 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS (2017). 
17 This article assumes some familiarity with the contours of this debate. The various positions are staked 
out in the following law review articles: Jay L. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: 
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991);  [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory 
and Pragmatism]; Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist 
Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperation in International 
Bankruptcy]; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality]; Westbrook, Global 
Solution, supra note 11; Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 819 (2007). 
18 See, e.g., Peter M. Gilhuly et al, Bankruptcy Without Borders: A Comprehensive Guide to the First 
Decade of Chapter 15, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. L.R. 47 (2016); R. Craig Martin & Cullen Drescher 
Speckhart, CHAPTER 15 FOR FOREIGN DEBTORS (2015). 
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within the system, and their interactions, processes, instrumentalities, methods, and 
frames of reference. We cannot hope to understand fully the dynamics of the system and 
the possible trajectories of its evolution without more comparative accounts of how the 
work of coordinating cross-border insolvency cases actually gets done iteratively on the 
ground over time.  
 To mark the twentieth anniversary of the Model Law, this article reviews 
experiences in two leading common law countries that were early adopters of the Model 
Law – the United States and the United Kingdom19 – to explore the Model Law’s self-
fulfilling limits as a coordinating instrument and the limits of modified universalism as a 
method for propelling the universalist agenda forward. I focus in particular on the 
frontline role domestic courts play in cross-border insolvency governance, in 
implementing international insolvency law, and in linking the international and domestic 
legal orders.  While the Model Law has successfully promoted domestic recognition of 
foreign insolvency proceedings, results have been predictably less consistent where it acts 
as a guiding framework and leaves local legislatures wide discretion on the detail of 
implementation. This is especially so when foreign insolvency trustees – “foreign 
representatives” in Model Law parlance – request domestic judges to grant discretionary 
relief entailing the application of, or deference to, foreign insolvency law. Local Model 
Law enactments confront judges with a species of interlegality20 taking the form of an 
interaction between the international and domestic legal orders. However, beyond 
                                                        
19 The selection is partly pragmatic. These are the countries with which I am most familiar and my personal 
standpoint is that of a transatlanticist striving to see the UK through US eyes and vice versa. Pragmatism 
aside, the US handles significantly more cases than any other enacting state and is by some distance the 
leading producer of Model Law jurisprudence, while the UK’s approach is representative of developments 
in the British common law world.  
20 WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION & LEGAL THEORY, 229-31 (2000) (discussing BOAVENTURA 
DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND 
EMANCIPATION (2002)).    
 8 
aspirational statements of legislative purpose, Model Law enactments provide these 
“glocal”21 judges with limited guidance in circumstances where foreign representatives 
request discretionary relief. With judges sometimes forced to choose between purpose-
oriented international norms and domestic law, it is hardly surprising that “glocal” 
judging generates inconsistent outcomes that do not satisfy universalists.22  Ultimately, 
judicial authority is constituted by domestic legal frameworks and cultures, which exert a 
gravitational force when judges encounter hard questions. Judges, as creatures of their 
own systems, work within leeways that are shaped by the manner of local legislative 
implementation and the judicial sense of how the Model Law “fits” within domestic 
cross-border insolvency law as a whole. 
Requests for relief often implicate choice-of-law questions. But the Model Law is 
choice-of-law neutral and domestic enactments typically contain no express choice-of-
law rules. Universalists urge judges to take their cue from modified universalism and 
interpret Model Law enactments in a system-oriented way with regard to universalist 
goals. But modified universalism is not yet a unified theory with an agreed set of 
characteristics. Modified universalism as it is generally understood by US scholars 
implies that judges should defer to the law of the foreign insolvency proceeding (the lex 
concursus) wherever possible, so as to mimic universalism’s preferred “one court, one 
law” approach. This is a strong “centralizing” version of modified universalism, 
associated with leading scholars, notably Jay Westbrook, that favors the closest possible 
                                                        
21 A term the origins of which are murky but which distils the idea of “thinking globally, acting locally”, 
e.g. through the adaptation of global brands to local markets. 
22 Some commentators attribute the inconsistency to modified universalism’s inbuilt concession to local 
interests and regard it as no bad thing. See, e.g, Edward S. Adams & Jason K. Fincke, Coordinating Cross-
Border Bankruptcy: How Territorialism Saves Universalism, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 43 (2009) [hereinafter 
Adams & Fincke, Coordinating Cross-Border Bankruptcy].  
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approximation of judicial practice to the universalist ideal. But modified universalism, as 
practiced in the UK under the Model Law and at common law, is a weaker strain that 
sticks resolutely to a forum insolvency law (lex fori) choice-of-law orientation. British 
modified universalism supports effective coordination of insolvency proceedings with 
one court having a primary coordinating role. But it lacks any commitment to a fully 
centralizing lex concursus rule in the absence of a specific domestic statutory mandate. In 
this “coordinating” version of modified universalism, local courts will try, where they 
deem it permissible, to provide foreign representatives with direct assistance under local 
insolvency law without the foreign representative needing to commence a duplicative, 
parallel insolvency proceeding.  
 The article proceeds in four sections. Section I reviews the Model Law and 
provides general background on its adoption and operation to date. It includes a brief 
account of the Model Law’s connection to the universalist agenda and a synthesis of 
available empirical evidence suggestive of its successes and limits. 
Section II frames the role of “glocal” judges as transnational, frontline actors in 
the international insolvency system seeking to make sense of local enactments of non-
binding international law within the context of local legal systems and cultures. In so 
doing, it pushes back against the tendency in academic discourse to characterize 
international insolvency cooperation within interstate framings premised on utilitarian 
notions of aggregate welfare (as per the “universalism” versus “territorialism” debate) 
while paying no attention to the mechanics of actual decision-making which relies on 
judicial agency.  
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Section III compares the reception of the Model Law in the US and the UK and 
the implications of Anglo-US reception for our understanding of modified universalism 
as a vehicle for harmonization. In the US, a powerful commitment to comity reinforces 
Model Law goals and instantiates a relatively strong centralizing version of modified 
universalism. However, some US courts decline deference to foreign court orders or 
foreign insolvency law either by prioritizing fidelity to domestic statutory text (meaning 
the Bankruptcy Code into which the Model Law has been incorporated) over an 
internationally oriented purposive interpretive method or by using Model Law concepts 
such as “sufficient protection” as a basis for resistance.  
In the UK, the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Rubin v. Eurofinance SA23 
subordinates the UK’s Model Law enactment to other pre-existing private international 
law frameworks and carves out from its scope the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
insolvency-related judgments, such as asset recovery orders or discharges. Rubin and 
subsequent cases, including cases from the British offshore world decided by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, adumbrate a weaker version of modified universalism 
that signals a powerful commitment to two related ideas: first, in keeping with the British 
common law concept of ancillary winding up, that jurisdiction to assist in cross-border 
cases is intrinsically domestic; and, second, that courts should not cooperate in a given 
instance without a specific, enumerated domestic statutory or common law basis for the 
requested assistance.  
As modified universalism’s choice-of-law orientation is contested and its strong 
and weak variants are self-reinforcing products of pre-existing legal cultural divergence, 
it cannot serve as a uniform guiding principle for resolving the inevitable tension between 
                                                        
23 [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 A.C. 236 (UK). 
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the universal aspirations of international law and its local application.24 To ask it to play 
such a role as regards choice-of-law is to ask courts to resolve questions about what an 
appropriate choice-of-law framework should look like that are best suited to further 
legislative determination. Accordingly, I argue towards the end of Section III that 
Professor Westbrook’s notion of a goals-oriented international interpretive rule25 is at 
odds with the realities of the Model Law’s divergent Anglo-US implementation and 
reception.  
Section IV offers some brief concluding thoughts about the respective roles of 
legislatures and judges in the evolution of cross-border insolvency law and in the further 
consolidation of the international forum shopping system. 
 
I. THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW: THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS IN OVERVIEW 
 
A. Origins, Objectives, and Scope 
 
The Model Law is a procedural private international law instrument that was 
adopted by UNCITRAL on May 31, 1997. 26 The Model Law’s aims are set out concisely 
in its preamble: 
 
The purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border  
Insolvency so as to promote the objectives of: 
 
                                                        
24 See Helmut Philipp Aust, Between Universal Aspiration and Local Aspiration and Local Application: 
Concluding Observations, in THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY DOMESTIC COURTS 
(Helmut Phillip Aust & Georg Nolte eds., 2015). 
25 See Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, supra note 10. 
26 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Thirtieth 
Session, (1997), U.N. Doc. A/52/17 (1997). For background see generally André J. Berends, The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. OF INT’L. & 
COMP. L. 309 [hereinafter Berends, UNCITRAL Model Law]; Jenny Clift, The UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency – A Legislative Framework to Facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-
Border Insolvency, 12 TUL. J. OF INT’L. & COMP. L. 307 (2004) [hereinafter Clift, UNCITRAL Model 
Law]; Jenny Clift, Choice of Law and the UNCITRAL Harmonization Process, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 20 (2014) [hereinafter Clift, Choice of Law].  
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(a) Cooperation between the courts and other competent authorities of this State and foreign 
States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency; 
(b) Greater legal certainty for trade and investment; 
(c) Fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of all 
creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor; 
(d) Protection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s assets: and 
(e) Facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby protecting investment 
and preserving employment. 
 
Its origins can be traced back to a joint colloquium organized by UNCITRAL and 
INSOL International, a prominent umbrella organization of national associations of 
insolvency professionals, held in Vienna in 1994. Building on earlier texts developed by 
organizations, such as the International Bar Association, an UNCITRAL Working Group, 
consisting of delegates from UNCITRAL member states and observers from professional 
organizations including INSOL and the International Bar Association, drafted and agreed 
the text of the Model Law and the accompanying Guide to Enactment over the course of 
four meetings between November 1995 and January 1997 – a remarkable achievement in 
such a short time frame. Since 1997 the text of the Model Law has not been amended but 
a revised Guide to Enactment was issued in January 2014. 
The speed with which the Model Law was agreed can be attributed to several 
factors. First, the Working Group’s deliberations were informed by developments in 
Europe where, after a stop-start process over a thirty-year period, the EU’s member states 
had finally agreed on the text of a Bankruptcy Convention.27 Second, the Working Group 
drew on recent initiatives by professional organizations, chiefly the International Bar 
Association. Third, many of the Working Group’s members had been involved in these 
roughly contemporaneous endeavors. Fourth, the Working Group chose to draft a model 
                                                        
27 See Berends, UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, 316-17. The Bankruptcy Convention never came 
into effect. However, it was resurrected in 2000 as an EU regulation. For background, see generally, IAN F. 
FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 339-58 (2005) [hereinafter FLETCHER, 
INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW].   
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law rather than a convention on the assumption that the provisions of a non-binding 
model law would be easier to draft and agree than a “take-it-or-leave-it” convention. 
The choice of a model law over a convention demonstrates that the approach of 
the Model Law’s framers was pragmatic and incremental.  The legislative consensus was 
that the Model Law should be narrow in scope and primarily procedural in orientation 
thus allowing progress to be made while reducing the risk that countries would not buy 
in. Insightful commentator and self-described universalist, John Pottow, characterizes the 
underlying strategy as:  
procedural incrementalism, a form of incrementalism that moves for gradually increasing 
subjugation of sovereignty on seemingly less threatening procedural matters as a form of 
acclimation to the imposition of foreign law (or at least foreign court control over) domestic 
insolvency proceedings.28   
 
Thus, while a global convention was favored as the optimal solution,29 the idea of a 
convention was kicked into the long grass, where it has largely remained.30 
 Comprehensive private international law instruments govern questions of venue, 
choice-of-law, the mutual recognition and enforcement of foreign proceedings and 
orders, and parallel proceedings (lis alibi pendens).31 The Model Law covers much less 
                                                        
28 See Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs, supra note 6, 209. See further Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, 
supra note 9. 
29 Reflecting the view of prominent judges in the common law world. See e.g., Sir Peter Millett, Cross-
Border Insolvency: The Judicial Approach, 6 INT’L. INSOLV. REV. 99, 108 (1997). 
30 See Clift, The UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, 308. See also Berends, UNCITRAL Model Law, 
supra note 26, 319 (“A model law is better than an unratified convention. A convention ratified by too few 
countries is worse than a partially enacted model law.”). Unsuccessful attempts have been made in the 
recent past at the instigation of the International Bar Association to revisit the idea of a global convention at 
UNCITRAL: see Report of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of its Forty-Fourth Session, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/78 (2013) at paras. 18-19; Goodbye UNCITRAL Model Law; Hello International 
Insolvency Convention, GLOBAL TURNAROUND, Apr. 2016, at 11 cf. Jenny Clift, UNCITRAL Model Law 
– alive and well in 43 jurisdictions and counting!, GLOBAL TURNAROUND, May 2016, at 11. 
31 Examples include the EU INSOLVENCY REGULATION, supra note 1; Regulation (EC) No.593/2008 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L.177/6); Regulation (EU) No.1215/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (recast), 2012 O.J. (L. 351/1); Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on 
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoptions.  
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ground. It defines the scope of a foreign proceeding. 32  It determines when foreign 
proceedings will be recognized in an enacting state drawing on well-established 
international jurisdictional standards borrowed from the EU Insolvency Regulation – 
namely, centre of main interests (“COMI”)33  and establishment34  – and provides for 
streamlined recognition35 of foreign main proceedings in the country where the debtor 
has its COMI and foreign non-main proceedings in countries where the debtor has an 
establishment,36 unless recognition would be “manifestly contrary to public policy” in the 
country in which recognition is sought.37 
The Model Law has three other core features. First, it confers direct rights of 
access to an enacting state’s courts on the foreign representative – that is, the party 
entrusted with the governance of the foreign proceeding who has standing under the 
Model Law to act as representative of the foreign proceeding38 − including the right of 
the foreign representative to apply for recognition of the foreign proceeding in which 
they have been appointed.39 It also promotes direct process and participatory rights for 
foreign creditors rooted in a principle of non-discrimination.40 
                                                        
32 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art 2(a) (“‘Foreign proceeding’ means a collective judicial or 
administrative proceeding in a foreign State, including an interim proceeding, pursuant to a law relating to 
insolvency in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by 
a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.”); GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, 
paras 62-79. 
33 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, arts. 2(b), 16(3), 17(2)(a); GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, 
paras. 1, 11, 18, 31, 81-84, 141-44, 145-49, 157-59, 162, 178, 236, 238. 
34 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, arts. 2(c), 2(f), 16(3), 17(2)(a); GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, paras. 32, 72, 
83, 85, 88-90 (noting the EU law derivation of establishment), 156, 160, 225-27, 235  
35 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, arts. 15-17; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras. 29, 127. 
36 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art.17(2); GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras.31-32. 
37 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art.6; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras.101-104. 
38 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art.2(d); GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras. 62-64, 86. 
39 On the foreign representative’s access and standing rights see MODEL LAW, supra note 4, arts.9-12, 15, 
23-24; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras.25-26. 
40 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, arts.13-14; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras.118-126.  See 
further Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 9, 980-82 (flagging the individual notice 
requirements in art.14) . 
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Second, it makes provision for the grant of relief in the enacting state to assist the 
foreign proceeding. Interim relief, pending recognition, is available at the discretion of 
the court.41 Fundamental forms of relief such as a stay of individual enforcement action 
against the foreign debtor or the debtor’s assets and a suspension of the debtor’s right to 
transfer or encumber assets come into effect automatically on recognition of a foreign 
main proceeding.42 Discretionary relief is also available following recognition to both 
foreign main and foreign non-main proceedings.43 The court can use its power to grant 
discretionary relief to expand the automatic relief applicable on recognition of a main 
proceeding or to provide relief to a foreign non-main proceeding.  
Third, it provides a framework for cooperation and communication, including 
court-to-court communication, and for coordination of concurrent proceedings relating to 
the same debtor in more than one country.44 This framework, which is not dependent on 
recognition, provides a legal foundation for the negotiation, use, and court approval of 
cross-border insolvency protocols as a mechanism for coordinating the various 
proceedings.45 
As a pragmatic exercise in the art of the possible, the Model Law is otherwise 
neutral by design. Its framers believed that neutrality was crucial to achieving the level of 
buy-in needed to break down procedural barriers and institute a basic international 
                                                        
41 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art.19; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras.35-36, 170 
(“Article 19 deals with ‘urgently needed’ relief that may be ordered at the discretion of the court and is 
available as of the moment of the application for recognition…”), 171-75. 
42 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art.20; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras.35-36, 176-188 
(“While relief under articles 19 and 21 is discretionary, the effects provided by article 20 are not, for they 
flow automatically from recognition of the foreign main proceeding.”). 
43 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art.21; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras. 35-36, 189-195. 
44 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, arts.25-32; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras. 3, 40-45, 209-
41. The Model Law in art.25(1) mandates cooperation (“…the court shall cooperate to the maximum extent 
possible with foreign courts or foreign representatives…”) but what such cooperation entails is left open-
ended in the interests of flexibility. 
45 See further U.N. COMM ON INT’L TRADE LAW, PRACTICE GUIDE ON CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY COOPERATION, U.N. Sales No. E.10.V.6 (2010). 
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architecture that would facilitate swift access to foreign courts for purposes of asset 
preservation.46 The Model Law makes no attempt at substantive unification of insolvency 
law. It has no uniform choice-of-law rules, and no enumerated rules on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign insolvency-related judgments, such as foreign discharge or claw 
back orders.47 Much is therefore left to local implementation and local rules.  
The Model Law therefore contrasts with the EU Insolvency Regulation – a more 
complete procedural private international law code forming part of the EU’s acquis 
communautaire, the body of supranational law directly applicable in EU member states 
by virtue of the EU’s founding treaties.48  This establishes a reciprocal legal framework 
containing uniform rules on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition of insolvency 
proceedings, and recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments. 
Importantly, the EU Insolvency Regulation leaves less leeway for divergent local 
implementation because it directly applies in Member States and its binding, 
                                                        
46 See Berends, UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, 319 (characterizing the Model Law as a “first 
step”), 321 (“The general idea behind the Model Law is that there are only three things that are important in 
cross-border insolvency: speed, speed, and more speed… To avoid the dissipation of assets that may result 
from time-consuming procedures or considerations, the Model Law also provides for a system that enables 
quick action.”). 
47 See id. 321 (“The Model Law does not modify the existing material rules concerning insolvency 
proceedings in the enacting State. The State effecting the opening of the proceedings does not export the 
effects it attaches to the insolvency proceeding; the law of the State where the foreign proceeding is 
recognized determines which effects are given to the proceeding.”). See also Clift, Choice of Law, supra 
note 26, 28-30. 
48 See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version 2016), 2016 O.J. (C. 
202/01), art. 288. The EU Insolvency Regulation does not apply to Denmark: see EU INSOLVENCY 
REGULATION, supra note 1, recital 88. On June 23, 2016, the UK’s electorate voted to leave the EU in a 
referendum. Until the UK formally withdraws in accordance with procedures set out in the Treaty on 
European Union (Consolidated version 2016), 2016 O.J. (C. 202/01), EU law, including the Insolvency 
Regulation, continues to apply.  Although the UK government notified the European Council of its 
intention to withdraw on March 29, 2017, the manner of the UK’s withdrawal and the nature of its future 
political and legal relationship with the EU is still to be determined.  Under Article 50(3) of the Treaty on 
European Union, the formal date of departure is the date the withdrawal agreement enters into force. This 
allows for the possibility of transitional arrangements. However, if agreement on terms of withdrawal is not 
reached, the Treaties will cease to apply in March 2019, two years after the UK’s withdrawal notification, 
unless the European Council agrees to extend the default two-year period. 
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supranational legal character is further reinforced by the centralized role that the Court of 
Justice of the European Union plays in its interpretation.  
Until it is locally enacted, the Model Law has no binding force. As the uniform 
text can be modified locally, the Model Law trades off flexibility against certainty49 and 
aims at harmonization by softer, non-binding means. Article 8 promotes harmonized 
interpretation of Model Law enactments,50 thus permitting courts to consider sources 
beyond the domestic text, and the Guide to Enactment encourages enacting states to be as 
faithful as possible to the Model Law text when incorporating it into their legal systems.51 
 The Model Law also contains no default reciprocity requirements.52 Instead, it 
favors unilateral commitments to recognition, relief and cooperation as a first move 
towards a multilateral framework based on what Professor Westbrook describes as 
“critical mass reciprocity”.53 The neutrality of the Model Law – especially as regards 
choice-of-law54 – is important because it leaves room for contestation between divergent 
legal traditions and between stronger and weaker forms of modified universalism, as we 
will see. 
                                                        
49 See GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, para. 20,  
50 Id. paras. 22, 106-107. 
51 Id. paras. 20-22. There is, however, no institutional mechanism for centralized interpretation, a function 
that the Court of Justice of the European Union performs in the EU context. 
52 See Keith D. Yamauchi, Should Reciprocity Be a Part of the UNCITRAL Model Cross-Border Insolvency 
Law, 16 INT. INSOLV. REV. 145 (2007). I pass no comment on the virtues or vices of reciprocity 
requirements. My point is to contrast the Model Law with the EU Insolvency Regulation which is 
supranational & multilateral in character. 
53 See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 17, 467 (identifying “critical mass reciprocity” as a 
subset of multilateral reciprocity “sufficient to convince each cooperating state that enough other states 
have joined in reciprocal relationships to ensure the obtaining of the benefits expected to flow from a 
particular sort of cooperation.”), 488 (discussing “common unilateralism” as a possible way to achieving 
critical mass reciprocity without the necessity for a treaty). 
54 See GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras. 35, 178; Clift, UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, 
324 (“…[T]he Model Law adopts a neutral approach, standardizing the effects of recognition…rather than 
importing the consequences of the foreign law into the insolvency system of the enacting State.”); Clift, 
Choice of Law, supra note 26, 28-30 (outlining how the Model Law’s framers, after considering various 
options, including an applicable “law of the main proceeding” rule, adopted a choice of forum test that was 
deliberately choice-of-law neutral so that recognizing courts would not be corralled into applying foreign 
law). 
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B. The Model Law as an Instrument of Modified Universalism 
 
There is a scholarly consensus that universalism, characterized as the 
“administration of multinational insolvencies by a leading court applying a single 
insolvency law”, is the ideal system for managing cross-border insolvencies in a global 
market setting.55 A system of “pure universalism” that combines “unity of insolvency” (a 
single, exclusive and preclusive insolvency forum in which assets and claims worldwide 
are administered and resolved) and “universality of insolvency” (a single insolvency law 
having worldwide effect) has always been considered politically unfeasible. 56  The 
universalist ideal in a world of sovereign nation states is a system in which a single main 
insolvency proceeding is instituted in the debtor’s “home” country – the country where 
the debtor has its COMI – with courts elsewhere assisting the “home” court to 
accomplish a unitary administration of the worldwide estate under “home” insolvency 
law. Thus, in the absence of a system of world government, the “ideal” is universality 
without unity: a dominant “home” court to which ancillary courts elsewhere will defer in 
order to facilitate centralized, collective administration of estate property and claims.57  
Normatively, this system of dominant and ancillary courts, rooted in principles of 
universality and deference, would achieve virtually everything to which universalists 
aspire. It would replicate transnationally the welfare benefits of domestic insolvency 
                                                        
55 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 11, 2277. 
56 Id. See also LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 17, 705-706; Adams & 
Fincke, Coordinating Cross-Border Bankruptcy, supra note 22, 48. On “unity” and “universality” and their 
binary opposites “plurality” and “territoriality” (which imply multiple domestic, territorial proceedings 
administered in accordance with local law), see FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, supra note 27, 11-15. 
57 See Westbrook, National Regulation, supra note 5, 778-79 (“The ideal of universalism is of a single 
primary bankruptcy proceeding in the debtor’s home country, with courts elsewhere acting in an ancillary 
or supportive role to the primary court, resulting in unitary administration of assets under one bankruptcy 
law.”). 
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systems by replacing a costly, duplicative, value-destructive international free-for-all 
with a global market-symmetrical, value maximizing, cost reducing, collective 
proceeding incorporating a single, efficient claims resolution process that affords 
similarly situated creditors equal treatment worldwide. It would pull cross-border 
insolvency law decisively away from territorialism − universalism’s polar opposite − an 
uncoordinated, state-centric default “system” in which each jurisdiction “grabs” and 
administers locally situated assets in a local insolvency proceeding for the benefit of 
creditors claiming locally with no regard for what is happening elsewhere.58 
As an intellectual paradigm, modern universalism (dating from around 1990) has 
two characteristics. First, it takes globalization for granted and assumes that law’s job is 
to facilitate global markets by making them as legally convergent and frictionless as 
possible.59 It posits a world in which creditor expectations are shaped globally rather than 
locally and dismisses territorialist concerns about the legitimate expectations of local 
creditors as a throwback to old notions of vested rights.60 In this sense, it represents a 
                                                        
58 In truth, “pure” or “ideal” universalism and wholly unmitigated territorialism are the bookends of a 
complex spectrum neither of which accords with reality. Territorialists, such as Professor LoPucki, do not 
support unmitigated territorialism and accept that legal convergence may ultimately create conditions for 
universalism: see LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 17, 2217. But territorialists worry about 
the imposition of COMI insolvency law on remote stakeholders and about universalism’s incursions into 
state sovereignty, especially its ramifications for local priority rules that implicate local policy preferences. 
These worries harbor a further concern that universalism will encourage pernicious forum shopping. 
Accordingly, territorialists prefer cooperation that accords sovereigns equal dignity over the global 
hegemony of COMI law: see LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 17, 709-713, 
743, 750; John J. Chung, The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Step Towards Erosion of 
National Sovereignty, 27 NW. J. INT’L & BUS. 89 (2006). 
59 See e.g. Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 11, 2277 (“The force that drives us to [the] future is 
free-market capitalism constrained in the vessel of democratic institutions. One important element in its 
progress is the fashioning of an international system for managing the financial crises that are one of the 
free market’s inevitable consequences.”). See further id. at 2288-92 (discussing how globalization and 
economic integration drive legal convergence and progress towards universalism). 
60 See id., 2301, 2320-22.  The universalist objection is to vested rights as understood in the unilateralist 
conflicts tradition associated with Currie: see e.g. William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-
Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 101, 110-119 (1998).   
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strand of thinking, akin to the Whig view of history,61 in which the world is progressing 
towards the perfection of the liberal international order. Second, it is profoundly North 
American in orientation. In the hands of its leading modern champion, Professor 
Westbrook, universalism amounts to a globalized version of US federal bankruptcy law – 
a single “meta” law that stays and collectivizes claims arising throughout the US under 
the non-bankruptcy law of multiple sovereign states with a view to liquidation or 
reorganization.62  
To what extent universalism’s globalizing, unifying paradigm can hold under the 
conditions of deglobalization prevailing in the second decade of the twenty first century 
is an open question. As a theory powerfully associated with liberal internationalism,63 it 
will need rethinking in an era in which the post-World War II liberal international order 
is withering.64 In any event, universalists have long acknowledged that “the ideal remains 
some distance away.”65 For now they put their faith in modified universalism, conceived 
of as an interim, transitional solution – a staging post on the road to universalism − which 
                                                        
61 See generally HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (1931). 
62 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 11, 2277 (“The only substantive objection is that 
universalism would too greatly submerge national policies, but experience in the United States and 
elsewhere demonstrates that a national, market-symmetrical law can largely accommodate local policies. In 
the same way, an international system could permit considerable play to varying national policies and could 
enforce them more effectively against multinationals.” See further id. at 2286-87 (discussing the 
establishment of the US bankruptcy system within the US constitutional order). 
63 On the connection between universalism and liberal international relations theory, see Lore Unt, 
International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation: Liberalism, Institutionalism, and 
Transnational Legal Dialogue, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1040 (1997). 
64 No sooner had Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the triumphant universalization of western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human government in THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 
(1992), others were sounding the panic bell: see, e.g. Stanley Hoffmann, The Crisis of Liberal 
Internationalism, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar. 1, 1995, at 159. Hoffmann was prescient: see id. at 174 (“The 
formation of a global transnational economy constitutes a triumph of the liberal vision that first appeared in 
the eighteenth century (when philosophers saw private interests cutting across borders as potential tamers 
of clashing state passions), but it also provides evidence of the fact that fulfillment of the vision has 
mounting costs and unexpected consequences.”). 
65 See Westbrook, National Regulation, supra note 5, 779. 
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makes concessions to sovereigntist concerns by accommodating protections for local 
creditors and state interests.  
The modified universalism that universalists generally favor maintains the 
dominant/ancillary court aspect of the universalist ideal but anticipates pragmatically that 
states may be unwilling to cede sovereignty over locally situated assets and creditors and 
reluctant to tolerate outcome differences that would arise were local assets and claims 
administered under COMI law priority rules rather than local priority rules. Under 
modified universalism’s dominant strain,66 the ancillary court is expected to defer to the 
law applicable in the main proceeding but such deference is not automatic. Ancillary 
courts retain the ability to evaluate the fairness of the main proceeding and to protect the 
interests of local creditors.67 They may refuse to defer where home country policies are at 
odds with fundamental local policies: a standard public policy escape route. 68  But 
universalists exhort ancillary courts to ignore trivial outcome differences in pursuit of the 
aggregate welfare benefits of cooperation over time.69 On this view, courts have some 
leeway in determining how or whether they cooperate but the leeway should be narrow. 
Supporters of the strain of modified universalism just outlined – call it American 
modified universalism − conceive of it as the best way to progress towards universalism 
                                                        
66 See Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs, supra note 6, 203 (referencing the “now-dominant paradigm of 
modified universalism”). 
67 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 11, 2301.  
68 See Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 9, 952-53. 
69 The idea is that the aggregate gains to be made from cooperation will offset losses suffered by creditors 
from outcome differences in individual cases: see Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 17, 464-
66 (discussing the “Rough Wash” and “Transactional Gain” arguments for universalism). LoPucki objects 
to this less than Pareto optimal aggregate welfarism: see Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 17, 2218 
(“Westbrook’s analysis ignores that it is creditors, not nations, that have entitlements in bankruptcy estates. 
The creditor that goes unpaid because its country surrenders the assets to a foreign court for distribution 
according to the foreign country’s laws is not consoled by the fact that some other creditor of the same 
nationality received a windfall from that foreign court in another case.”). I demur because I doubt that 
judges whose focus is on the immediate case in hand, rather than on aggregate welfare across a run of 
cases, can effectively implement such a system absent a clear statutory mandate: see further Section II, 
infra. 
 22 
in the absence of an international convention. 70  Sometimes, they frame modified 
universalism as a transitional means for laying foundations, through sustained 
cooperative engagement, for a global convention.71 At other times, they view “modified 
universalism with presumptive deference to COMI law” (as I would characterize it) as a 
system that will replicate most of the benefits of universalism even in the absence of a 
convention. The assumption is that if courts are encouraged through international 
cooperation to “produce results as close to those that would arise from a single 
proceeding as local law will permit”,72 modified universalism will create a workable 
proxy for universalism without the need for a convention.73  
Commentators generally agree that the Model Law is an instrument that embodies 
modified universalism74 or, at worst, an artful compromise between universalism and 
                                                        
70 See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 11, 2302.  
71 Id. 
72 Id.  
73 I speculate that American advocates of modified universalism know only too well that global private 
international law conventions, especially conventions that will command widespread (including US) 
support, have proved historically difficult to achieve. The Hague Conference successfully engineered a 
Choice of Court Convention and has subsequently revived the idea of a global Judgments Convention. See 
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/judgments. But if past is prologue there are reasons to 
be pessimistic about the Judgments Project’s prospects.  
74 See Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 7, 716; Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 9, 
963-69 (describing the Model Law as having core universalist features with territorialist caveats); Janger, 
supra note 17, 824 (“Under a modified universalist regime, the insolvency case is governed from the 
debtor’s…COMI. Assets in multiple jurisdictions are administered…by the local courts, but those courts 
defer to the main proceeding for administration of the case. This is the approach embodied in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency…”); Adams & Fincke, Coordinating Cross-Border 
Bankruptcy, supra note 22, 61-63 (describing the Model Law as modified universalism with a territorialist 
foundation); Irit Mevorach, On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.R. 517, 520 (2011) (“The 
Model Law…aim[s] at a ‘modified universalism’, promoting a regime which allows for opening more than 
one set of proceedings but also strives for maximum cooperation and a worldwide perspective.”); Allan L. 
Gropper, The Curious Disappearance of Choice of Law as an Issue in Chapter 15 Cases, 9 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 152, 153 (2014) (hereinafter Gropper, Curious Disappearance) (US enactment of 
the Model Law in Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code described as substituting “the principle of modified 
universalism for territorial principles that had previously prevailed.”); Andrew Dawson, The Problem of 
Local Methods in Cross-Border Insolvencies, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 53 (2015) (hereinafter Local 
Methods) (“The Model Law, adopted in the United States Bankruptcy Code under Chapter 15, embodies 
the modified universalist approach.”); REINHARD BORK, PRINCIPLES OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY 
LAW 26-44 (2016). 
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territorialism.75 It embraces the concept of a dominant main proceeding presumptively 
entitled to administer the debtor’s worldwide insolvency in the jurisdiction where the 
debtor has its COMI and yet, at the same time, gives courts grounds for not cooperating, 
or for conditioning their cooperation, having regard to local public policy or stakeholder 
concerns, while also permitting concurrent, plenary local proceedings.76 
But its real significance for universalists who subscribe to “modified universalism 
with presumptive deference to COMI law” lies in the fact that the Model Law’s system of 
recognition and relief is anchored by a choice-of-forum rule – the COMI principle − that 
can double up as a choice-of-law rule. And so although, as I outlined earlier, the Model 
Law is choice-of-law neutral, and does not insist that the recognizing court concede the 
application of main proceeding insolvency law, it adopts as its core the 
dominant/ancillary court model, and, in theory, permits ancillary courts to behave 
“universalistically”, i.e. by choosing to defer to main proceeding insolvency law. 77 
Universalists therefore regard the Model Law as incrementally advancing a universalist 
agenda.78 They see leeway for courts in Model Law enacting states, to approximate to 
                                                        
75 See Sefa Franken, Cross-Border Insolvency Law: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 34 OX. J. LEG. 
STUDIES 97, 98, 116 (suggesting that the Model Law reflects a cooperative territorialist approach). 
76 See Clift, Choice of Law, supra note 26; see also MODEL LAW, supra note 4, arts. 17(2)(a) (recognition 
of foreign main proceeding based on debtor’s COMI); 6 (public policy exception to recognition or relief); 
21(2) (ancillary court’s power to entrust distribution of assets to foreign representative subject to court 
being satisfied that interests of local creditors are adequately protected); 22(1) (ancillary court’s power to 
grant or deny relief under art.19 or 21 conditioned on court being satisfied that the interests of creditors and 
other interested persons, including the debtor, are adequately protected); 28-29 (preserving possibility of 
full local concurrent proceedings subject to requirements for cooperation and coordination). 
77 See Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 9, 970-72.  
78 Id., 970. See also Clift, Choice of Law, supra note 26, 33 (“While the Model adopts [a] middle path, at 
the same time, it is advancing the universalist agenda, recognizing the primacy of one proceeding (the main 
proceeding), albeit with what might be described as an incremental approach, and fostering greater 
acceptance of differences.”). Universalists promote a similar agenda in relation to corporate groups. See 
Samuel L. Bufford, Coordination of Insolvency Cases for International Enterprise Groups: A Proposal, 86 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 685 (2013). 
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universalist outcomes wherever possible, and nudge modified universalism towards 
universalism proper. And they advocate for judges to behave accordingly.79 
In theory, then, the Model Law is universalism’s Trojan horse. Its neutrality 
should make it palatable for countries to adopt and repeated interactions between 
enacting states should acclimate courts to cooperation along universalist lines. In time, 
the presumed entitlement of the COMI court to control the administration of the estate 
and resolution of claims on a global basis should harden the COMI principle as a choice-
of-law as well as a choice-of-forum rule, creating conditions for linear progress towards 
actualization of the universalist model in the real world. However, as the Model Law’s 
neutrality presents ancillary courts with choices (deference, non-deference, or something 
in between) but disguises the underlying choice-of-law questions,80 it is equally plausible 
that its middle-of-the-road compromise will yield an uneven distribution of inconsistent 
decisional outcomes. This is especially so as regards those aspects of the Model Law that 
confront judges with leeways that involve (implicit) choices between international 
cooperation and fidelity to hard-wired domestic legal norms or pre-existing domestic 
conceptions of cooperation that the Model Law – or its local manner of implementation  
– does not displace. I develop this theme in Sections II and III.  
 
C. Patterns of Adoption 
 
To date, forty-six jurisdictions have enacted laws based on the Model Law.81 
Some regional patterns have emerged, notably the Model Law’s wholesale adoption by 
                                                        
79 See Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, supra note 10. 
80 See Gropper, Curious Disappearance, supra note 74.  
81 See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html. The 
jurisdictions are: Australia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, 
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the Francophone countries that constitute the Organization for the Harmonization of 
Business Law in Africa (OHADA), and its adoption at different times by the NAFTA 
countries (Canada, Mexico, and the US), by four countries in the Asia-Pacific region 
(Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore), and by three countries in Central and 
South America (Chile, Colombia, and Mexico). 82 However, very few EU member states 
have enacted the Model Law.83  Other jurisdictions, such as Israel and Thailand, are 
considering adoption.  
Critics, impatient at the rate of progress since 1997, identify the Model Law’s 
widespread lack of adoption among many significant UNCITRAL and OECD member 
states as a sign of weakness. 84 Conversely, adoption by developing countries that do not 
have high volumes of cross-border cases gives credence to the view that World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund programs are spreading the Model Law by coercive 
means.85 Model Law enactments also exhibit considerable variation. Some stick closely 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Japan, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Niger, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, 
Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom (which has separate 
enactments covering Great Britain and Northern Ireland and is therefore counted as two jurisdictions), 
United States, Vanuatu, and two British overseas territories, British Virgin Isles and Gibraltar. 
82 Singapore, which is seeking to position itself as the leading restructuring hub in Asia, is the most 
significant recent adopter. For background see Wee Meng Seng, Lessons for the Development of 
Singapore’s International Insolvency Law, 23 SING. AC L.J. 932, 966 (2011); FINAL REPORT OF THE 
INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE (2013) (Singapore) at 229-43; Kannan Ramesh, Cross-Border 
Insolvencies: A New Paradigm, speech delivered at the International Association of Insolvency Regulators’ 
Annual Conference and General Meeting, September 6, 2016, http://abli.asia/NEWS-EVENTS/Whats-
New/ID/23 at para.19 (confirming Singapore’s commitment to adopting the Model Law).  
83 See Jenny Clift, UNCITRAL Model Law – alive and well in 43 jurisdictions and counting!, GLOBAL 
TURNAROUND, May 2016, at 10 (suggesting that many EU member states apply the EU Insolvency 
Regulation’s provisions externally and regard the Model Law as unnecessary). 
84 See S. Chandra Mohan, Cross-Border Insolvency Problems: Is the UNCITRAL Model Law the Answer?, 
21 INT’L. INSOLV. REV. 199, 207 (2012) (identifying that 91% of UN members, 82% of UNCITRAL 
members, 81% of EU members, 58% of the G20, and 5 members of the G8 had not adopted the Model 
Law). Significant states with large economies that have not formally adopted the Model Law include: 
Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, and Russia. 
85 On international institutional support for Model Law adoption as a best practice standard, see id. 206-7. 
See further, Goodbye UNCITRAL Model Law; Hello International Insolvency Convention, GLOBAL 
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to the Model Law text, a practice encouraged by the Guide to Enactment.86  Others 
deviate in various ways reinforcing the impression that the Model Law is a non-binding 
procedural instrument at best.87  
 
D. The Model Law in Practice: Empirical Evidence 
 
Empirical studies on the operation of Model Law enactments published so far 
have focused mainly on the US’s Model Law enactment in chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.88 Three US studies considered the whole population of chapter 15 cases up to 
defined cut off dates, but these studies are already somewhat historic.89 A fourth study 
                                                                                                                                                                     
TURNAROUND, Apr. 2016, at 11 (attributing the OHADA enactments to conditions attached by the World 
Bank to debt restructuring aid). 
86 See GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras.21-22. 
87 See Mohan, supra note 84, 208-15 (outlining various deviations from the Model Law text in local 
enactments including express reciprocity requirements, wider than contemplated exclusions for banks and 
financial institutions, wider public policy exceptions, and access restrictions). See also FLETCHER, 
INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 27, 486 (expressing optimism about the 
Model Law as a “first-base advance along the arduous path of the journey towards a really worthwhile and 
effective model of international regulation of cross-border insolvency” but cautioning that “[t]he fact that it 
is open to a State to enact as much, or as little, of the Model Law as it pleases is likely to be viewed by 
some as an Achilles’ heel of this form of international harmonization.”); Kent Anderson, Testing the Model 
Soft Law Approach to International Harmonisation: A Case-Study Examining the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency, 23 AUS. YEARBOOK OF INT’L LAW 1, 11-14 (2004) (doubting whether 
Japan has fully implemented the Model Law given deviations from the official text); Andrew Godwin et al, 
The Inherent Power of Common Law Courts to Provide Assistance in Cross-Border Insolvencies: From 
Comity to Complexity, 26 INT’L. INSOLV. REV. 5, 35 (2017) (noting Canadian deviations from the Model 
Law text and acknowledging the variable permutations of local Model Law enactments and interpretive 
practices). 
88 See Andrew Dawson, Offshore Bankruptcies, 88 NEB. L. REV. 317 (2009); Jeremy Leong, Is Chapter 15 
Universalist or Territorialist? Evidence from United States Bankruptcy Cases, 29 WIS. INT’L. L.J 110 
(2011); Jay L. Westbrook, An Empirical Study of the Implementation in the United States of the Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (2013). 
89 Dawson’s dataset includes all chapter 15 cases filed between Oct. 17, 2005 (when chapter 15 became 
effective) and Oct. 17, 2008. Leong’s dataset includes all chapter 15 cases filed between chapter 15 coming 
into effect and Jun. 8, 2009 (although he counts cases that were administratively consolidated as a single 
case). Westbrook’s dataset includes all chapter 15 cases filed between chapter 15 coming into effect and 
Jan. 30, 2012.  
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includes cases from eight jurisdictions but confirms the US’s dominance of case 
volumes.90 
With one important caveat, the studies show that the recognition process under 
Model Law enactments works smoothly.91 Courts grant recognition as a foreign main 
proceeding in the vast majority of cases. Courts rarely invoke the public policy exception 
in Article 6. 92  Moreover, although the Model Law makes no specific provision for 
corporate groups,93 and its recognition standards must be applied entity by entity, the 
evidence suggests that the Model Law is used with some success to assist foreign group 
proceedings administratively consolidated in a single jurisdiction.94 An unpublished study 
by Alix Partners, which covers the entire population of chapter 15 cases up to September 
2016, confirms the impression that courts grant recognition routinely and swiftly.95  
The caveat concerns offshore jurisdictions. Courts must recognize a foreign 
proceeding as a main proceeding if it was commenced where the debtor has its COMI.96 
While the debtor’s registered office is presumptively the COMI,97 the registered office 
                                                        
90 See Mevorach, supra note 74. Mevorach’s dataset captures case abstracts and decisions up to January 
2011from a variety of databases including UNCITRAL’s CLOUT database, Westlaw, LexisNexis and 
WordLII. 145 out of 195 cases in the dataset were US cases. 
91 See Leong, supra note 88, (recognition granted in 88 out of 94 cases); Westbrook, supra note 88, 254-55 
(recognition granted in around 96% of cases); Mevorach, supra note 74, 533-37 (recognition granted in 186 
out of 195 cases with objections raised and litigated in only a handful of cases). 
92 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art.6; GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras.101-104. 
Recognition can be refused if it would be “manifestly contrary” to an enacting state’s public policy. The 
use of the qualifier “manifestly” signals that the exception should be restrictively construed. 
93 UNCITRAL has issued legislative guidance on the treatment of enterprise groups in insolvency for 
national legislatures and is considering amendments to the Model Law to deal specifically with the cross-
border insolvency of groups. See UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, PART 3 
(2010),  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html; 
UNCITRALWorking Group V, Facilitating the cross-border insolvency of multinational enterprise 
groups: draft legislative provisions, October 3, 2016, A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.142 (Note by the UNCITRAL 
Secretariat).  
94 See Mevorach, supra note 74, 537-43; Westbrook, supra note 88, 265-68. 
95 Presented by Simon Appell at a panel session on the Model Law at the Annual Conference of the 
International Bar Association in Washington DC on Sep. 20, 2016 (on file with author). 
96 See MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art.17(2)(a). 
97 Id., art.16(3). 
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presumption can be rebutted where the central administration of the debtor, as discerned 
by creditors, is somewhere other than the corporate domicile. To qualify for recognition 
as a foreign non-main proceeding, the proceeding must have commenced in a jurisdiction 
where the debtor has an establishment, meaning “any place of operations where the 
debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods or 
services.”98 The adoption of these formal recognition standards aligned the Model Law 
with the EU Insolvency Regulation and placed the emphasis on the location of core 
governance functions and the administration of the debtor’s operating business. This had 
the intended effect of disfavoring offshore domiciled “letterbox” entities that are 
managed onshore while maintaining only a formal connection with the offshore 
jurisdiction.99 This effect was amplified in US practice by the Bear Stearns decision, 100 
which held that the court must satisfy itself that the recognition standards are met even 
when no party has objected to recognition. Although the tide has turned back towards 
offshore jurisdictions in light of more recent case law, which acknowledges that COMI 
can become lodged in the offshore jurisdiction where an insolvency proceeding is 
                                                        
98 Id., arts. 2(f), 17(2)(b). 
99 See Dawson, supra note 88, 328. See also Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 7, 727-28; 
Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 11, 2317 (“A naked incorporation in a sun-drenched bank haven 
would easily fall before proof of the actual center of the business.”).  Westbrook was a member of the US 
delegation to UNCITRAL during the period of the Model Law’s gestation and was involved in its drafting. 
He was also the co-drafter of chapter 15 
100 In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structure Credit Strategies Master Fund, Inc., 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). See Dawson, supra note 88, 336-40 (finding a 
significant decrease in filings from haven countries after Bear Stearns). See also Westbrook, supra note 88, 
254-55, 262-63 (63% of chapter 15 cases in which foreign main proceeding recognition was denied 
originated from tax havens). Under section 304, chapter 15’s statutory predecessor, the debtor or its foreign 
representative could file an ancillary petition and seek relief in aid of a foreign proceeding in the US 
without filing a full bankruptcy case. Relief was discretionary and standards-based and the court was 
required to exercise its discretion by reference to a series of factors, including comity: see Dawson, supra 
note 88, at 325-28. There were, however, no threshold jurisdictional criteria and so a domiciliary 
proceeding commenced in a haven jurisdiction was prima facie entitled to seek relief and the main issue 
was whether relief should be granted. 
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pending,101 the Model Law’s emphasis on substantial, rather than formal jurisdictional 
connections, made it initially less “recognition friendly” for insolvency proceedings of 
offshore domiciliaries while increasing the prospect that ancillary courts in the country of 
the corporate domicile would recognize a foreign proceeding of their own domiciliary 
because its business was being conducted and administered elsewhere.102  
The Model Law’s attempts to harmonize streamlined recognition standards and to 
steer enacting states away from time consuming idiosyncratic local practices such as 
exequatur and letters rogatory103 have succeeded. And because recognition as a main 
proceeding carries with it automatic relief, including a stay on individual enforcement, 
the Model Law has also succeeded in granting foreign representatives access to a basic 
package of relief. This is an undoubted triumph for soft law.104 Predictably, however, the 
evidence suggests that practice as regards the granting of more extensive discretionary 
                                                        
101 In the Matter of Fairfield Sentry Limited, Morning Mist Holdings Limited et al. v. Kenneth Krys et al., 
714 F.3d 127 (2nd Cir. 2013), aff’g 440 B.R. 60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), 2011 WL 4357421 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011); In re Suntech Power Holdings Co., 520 B.R. 399 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). Cf. In re Millenium 
Global Engineering Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458 B.R. 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d 474 B.R. 88, 93 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras.157-59. See also 8 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1517.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.); Jay L. Westbrook, Chapter 
15 Comes of Age, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW (Sarra ed. 2013) at 185-86. Courts have 
also accepted that debtors can switch COMIs for purposes of restructuring to offshore as well as onshore 
jurisdictions before the filing of the recognition petition. See, e.g. In re Ocean Rig UDW Inc., 570 B.R. 687 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
102 See, e.g. In re Buccaneer Energy Limited, [2014] FCA 711 (Aus.) (Australian court recognizing US 
chapter 11 proceeding of Australian public company with Australian stock exchange listing on the basis 
that the center of main interests was in the US); In re 19 Entertainment Limited, [2016] EWHC 1545 (Ch) 
(UK) (English High Court recognizing US chapter 11 proceeding of UK subsidiary of US group where 
evidence showed its business and operations were conducted in Los Angeles).  
103 See GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras. 7-8. 
104 Though, as the US was already accustomed to granting such relief under section 304, success should not 
be exaggerated. See, e.g. the observations of Judge Barnes in In re Ace Track Co., Ltd., 556 B.R. 887, 897 
(Bankr. N.D. Illinois 2016) (“Cynically, it seems that much of the international cooperation that has taken 
place thereunder would have happened nonetheless under the preexisting framework developed under what 
was section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
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relief is spottier.105 Thus, the Model Law is self-fulfilling. Its structure is predictive of the 
patterns observed in the empirical studies.106 
That the Model Law is an American-led enterprise is beyond doubt.107 US case 
volumes dwarf those in the other enacting states, as one would expect given America’s 
outsized position in the global economy. The US enacted the Model Law out of a 
conviction that others would follow America’s lead.108 By signaling its commitment to 
the Model Law, and acceptance of some constraints on US jurisdiction over US-based 
assets and claims, the US sought to encourage other countries to acquiesce in the creation 
of a multilateral system of coordination, the benefits of which would become apparent 
over time. But one consequence of an implicit bargaining strategy, in which a dominant 
state pursues its interests by shaping the character of the international order, is that other 
countries may resist. The friction between forms and cultures of international insolvency 
cooperation in the US and the UK, discussed further below in Section III, is one source of 
resistance to the development of a multilateral system along American universalist lines. 
 
 
 
                                                        
105 Leong found that local assets were remitted for administration in the foreign proceeding in less than 
50% of cases and that unconditional turnover of assets was ordered in only 9.1% of cases in which 
recognition was granted and in which there were local creditors. His findings must be treated with some 
caution – see Westbrook, supra note 88, 260-61 – but they suggest unsurprisingly that ancillary courts tend 
to qualify relief by reference to local considerations. 
106 A view that universalists do not dispute. See Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, supra note 10, 
743 (“Given [the Model Law’s] structure, one would expect to see considerable success in achieving 
recognition and a more mixed bag as to relief granted, which is a fair description of what has happened in 
the adopting countries.”). 
107 A cursory search of Model Law case law on UNCITRAL’s CLOUT system provides ample 
confirmation. See http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html.  
108 See Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 7, 726 (“The number one reason for adopting it was to 
demonstrate the United States commitment to the Model Law and to cooperation and universalism 
generally, in the hope that our example would encourage other countries to follow.”). For legislative history 
see also NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT 
TWENTY YEARS, 351-70 (1997); H.R. REP. NO. 190-31, at 105-119 (2005) [hereinafter HOUSE 
REPORT]. 
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II. INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION AND “GLOCAL” JUDGES 
 
Where frameworks for coordination of cross-border commercial activity derive 
from instruments of private international law, domestic courts are in the front line of 
global governance.109 Thus, it is domestic courts that allocate governance authority in 
cross-border insolvency cases. The decision-making matrix for courts often has a binary 
quality. Decisions to assume insolvency jurisdiction rather than defer to a foreign court 
on forum non conveniens grounds, or to grant rather than deny recognition to a foreign 
insolvency proceeding, or to apply local priority rather than foreign priority rules to the 
distribution of local assets, or to domesticate rather than resist enforcement of a foreign 
insolvency court judgment, all affect how governance authority is allocated and exercised 
among states.110 
The well-rehearsed “universalism vs. territorialism” debate is concerned with 
what an appropriate framework for international insolvency cooperation should ideally 
look like. It is framed theoretically in terms of states’ interests on the international plane. 
Stripped to its basics, it involves arguments about the benefits of states conceding some 
sovereignty in return for aggregate welfare gains from cooperation.111 Thus, the literature 
focuses on states’ incentives to cooperate and/or on how states’ incentives may influence 
the contours of the international framework.112  
                                                        
109 See Ralf Michaels, Global Problems in Domestic Courts in THE LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE LAW (Muller et al eds. 2011) at 165, 173-74.    
110 See Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV. 67 (2009). 
111 See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 17; LoPucki, Cooperation in International 
Bankruptcy, supra note 17; LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 17; Franken, supra note 75; 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J. LAW ECON. 775 (1999);   
Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177 
(2000). 
112 See especially, Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 17; Franken, supra note 75; Frederick 
Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible? 23 MICH. J. INT’L. L. (2001) and Fear of Commitment in 
International Bankruptcy, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 555 (2001). 
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Universalists contend that the benefits of cooperation under their model exceed 
any costs associated with loss of sovereignty whereas territorialists contend the opposite. 
As universalism, territorialism, and the plethora of intermediate positions, modified 
universalism chief among them, have come to permeate legal discourse, they have 
become convenient frames for talking about judicial decision-making in individual cases.  
If a judge refuses to remit assets to a main proceeding unless and until the claims of local 
lien creditors are satisfied, we are tempted to describe the judicial behavior crudely as 
“territorialist”. Conversely, if a judge remits the assets and directs local lien creditors to 
file their claims in the foreign proceeding, we are tempted to describe the judicial 
behavior as “universalist”. Theorizing about model specifications at a high level of 
generality has given international insolvency lawyers a conceptual – perhaps even a 
moral − vocabulary that we now use to talk about individual cases at a “street” level of 
generality.  
In the process, theory has metastasized. Universalism’s normatively laden account 
of how inter-country cooperation should be constructed at an abstract level of generality 
has morphed into a meta judicial guiding principle. The modified universalist frame of 
American universalists enlists judges as the change agents who, by crafting 
approximations of universalist outcomes, will nurture the growth of a universalist 
system. 113  But there is a disconnect. Judges are not policymakers operating at the 
theoretical level of system design. In the common law tradition (my immediate frame of 
reference as an Anglo-American), they are decision-makers who resolve disputes by 
deciding the immediate case and controversy in accordance with law and their judicial 
                                                        
113 See infra Section III.D. 
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oath, having due regard for precedent.114 So, while the argument that we should not 
sacrifice aggregate benefits that could be gained through universalistic cooperation over 
time on the altar of local creditor interests is a defensible utilitarian position,  judges do 
not operate within this type of frame. 115  Instead, judges decide whether or not to 
cooperate in specific instances working within the leeways afforded them by the 
applicable (local) legal framework. 
For us to understand the practical utility of modified universalism as a principle 
for guiding judicial decision-making, we therefore need to pay attention to judges and 
their frames of reference and go beyond the accounts of judicial agency that we have in 
the international insolvency law literature to date. John Pottow, writing insightfully from 
a universalist perspective on how a sovereign’s interests in enforcing its own law will 
affect its incentives to commit to a universalist system, has made a fine start.116 But 
ultimately (and this is not intended as a criticism – Pottow’s purpose, which is primarily 
theoretical, differs from mine), he conceives of decisions not to cooperate as decisions of 
“states” without fully drilling down into judicial frames of reference. There is then, as I 
                                                        
114 For a persuasive general account of how theoretical legal scholarship fails to account for the nature of 
legal phenomenon at what I call the “street level”, see Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal 
Phenomena, Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 
683 (2002) esp. at 693 (“Courts at all levels…ignore the theorists, while citing the practitioners. The judges 
apparently, and not surprisingly, are looking for answers to discrete questions, not solutions grounded in 
grand theory.”). 
115 LoPucki’s critique of the twin pillars of Westbrook’s universalism (“Transactional Gain” and “Rough 
Wash”) in Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 11 at 2218 is germane: “Westbrook’s analysis ignores that 
it is creditors, not nations, that have entitlements in bankruptcy estates. The creditor that goes unpaid 
because its country surrenders the assets to a foreign court for distribution according to the foreign 
country’s laws is not consoled by the fact that some other creditor of the same nationality received a 
windfall from that foreign court in another case.” See also John Pottow, Greed and Pride in International 
Bankruptcy: The Problems and Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests”, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1908 
[hereinafter Pottow, Greed and Pride] (elaborating on how local creditors in countries where the ratio of 
assets to claims is high lose out under universalism). My positivistic-cum-realistic riff on LoPucki is that 
some judges in the common law tradition will find it difficult to defer to foreign law without explicit 
statutory command. See infra Section III.  
116 See Pottow, Greed and Pride, supra note 115. 
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think universalists would acknowledge, a problem that a policy of interstate cooperation 
driven by state level incentives on the international plane is implemented by domestic 
courts in individual cases as they arise.117  
The Model Law presents a commonplace legal transposition problem 
characterized by interlegality. Its origins are international but it has to be enacted by 
states to have any legal effect. The source of any legally binding norms is domestic law 
and the orders of domestic courts made thereunder. In dualist systems, even a convention 
– which creates interstate rights and obligations on the international plane – is not a 
source of directly enforceable rights and obligations within domestic law. Accordingly, 
insofar as the Model Law is a source of international norms, these norms only take effect 
through transplantation into domestic legal orders. Domestic legislatures plant 
international seeds in domestic soil. All of this is so well understood as to be banal. It is 
also a trite comparative lawyer’s point that the nature of the soil will affect how (or 
whether) the seeds grow.118  
When a state enacts the Model Law, the enacting state is, of course, internalizing 
Model Law norms. But in a framework that confers discretion on courts in individual 
cases, a straightforward problem of interlegality is apparent. Two normative orders have 
a bearing on judicial discretion: the domestic legal order, which both constitutes and 
constrains the domestic court and serves as its primary source of legal authority; and the 
normative order of international insolvency cooperation – a non-state order albeit one 
                                                        
117 See id. at 1919 (making the point, albeit with particular reference to former § 304, that modified 
universalist regimes, can face the difficulty that resolution of “policy-clash problems at the sovereign-state 
level” is in the hands of decision-makers tasked by law “to conduct analyses at the individual-participant 
level.”). I would go further and say that discretionary decision-making at the individual-participant level 
across systems is a function, in part, of local legal culture and locally constructed leeways.  
118 See generally DAVID NELKEN & JOHANNES FEEST, ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES (2001). 
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based on international consensus − internalized by the domestic Model Law enactment. 
Interlegality demands that judges (consciously or unconsciously) navigate the interaction 
of these normative orders. It is conceivable that Model Law “high generality” cooperative 
norms (such as a preference for reorganization and value maximization) may push in one 
direction while the local enacted text, and the wider domestic legal order in which it is 
embedded, will pull in the opposite direction.  
In the event of this kind of “text versus purpose” conflict – which will often 
present as a suppressed “should the court defer to the ‘home’ insolvency court/law?” 
comity-cum-choice-of-law question – judges operate “glocally”. The local enactment 
may well require them to pay attention to the international (global) origin of the Model 
Law and its legislative purpose and permit them to go beyond the local text for purposes 
of interpretation (to consider, for example, the Model Law and Guide to Enactment and, 
via Article 8, foreign court rulings on Model Law provisions). And yet they are still 
anchored within their domestic system and its path dependencies.119 The extent of the 
porosity between global and local – which courts will determine in applying the domestic 
enactment over time – will, in turn, determine how the “global” influences the “local” or 
vice versa. How the interaction plays out will shape the reception of international norms 
within domestic law. 120  Interlegality does not presuppose any particular outcome. 
                                                        
119 On the importance of historical institutionalism and path dependency in understanding the evolution of 
law and policy comparatively see Iain Ramsay, US Exceptionalism, Historical Institutionalism, and the 
Comparative Study of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 947 (2015). See also Oona A. 
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law 
System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); John Bell, Path Dependence and Legal Development, 87 TUL. L. 
REV. 787 (2013).  
120 See generally William Twining, Diffusion and Globalization Discourse, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 507 
(2006) and Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 473 
(2010). See also TWINING, supra note 20; Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANNUAL REVIEW 
OF LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 243 (2009); Kaarlo Tuori, Transnational Law: On Legal Hybrids 
and Legal Perspectivism in TRANSNATIONAL LAW: RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL 
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Normative orders can conflict or they can fuse and accommodate through contestation, 
coordination, and negotiation, 121  though accommodation of international norms may 
depend on questions of national “fit”.122  
This question of how domestic courts handle norms that originate from the 
international order is old hat. There is an extensive literature on the role of national courts 
in the international legal order, much of it seeking to come to terms with the impact of 
globalization on Westphalian “black-box” notions of national territorial sovereignty.123 A 
related literature explores divergence in national interpretation of international law – 
international conventions in particular.124 A large subset of this literature is concerned 
with the domestic reception of public international law in circumstances where 
international law has not formally become part of domestic law within dualist systems. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
THINKING (Maduro et al eds. 2014) (on plural legal orders and interlegality); Michele Graziadei, 
Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Reimann & Zimmermann eds. 2006) (on how transfer and reception both diffuses 
and shapes norms); Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in 
Creating and Enforcing International Law, 60 INTL. & COMP. L. Q. 57 (2011) (on the dual nature of the 
role of national courts in the creation and enforcement of international law). 
121 Twining, Diffusion and Globalization Discourse, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 507 (2006), 513 (“Interlegality 
suggests interaction between discrete entities, but the interaction is often more like that between waves or 
clouds or rivulets than between hard, stable entities like rocks or billiard balls.”). See also Paul Schiff 
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L.R. 1158 (2007), Federalism and International Law 
Through the Lens of Legal Pluralism, 73 MO. L. REV. 1151 (2008), and Towards a Jurisprudence of 
Hybridity, 1 UTAH L.R. 11 (2010); Robert Wai, The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 107 (2008). 
122 See Antoine Hol, Highest Courts and Transnational Interaction, 8 UTRECHT L.R. 1 (2012) (on the 
tension between consistency in transnational law and internal coherence in domestic legal systems). 
123 See, e.g. Neil Walker, Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of 
Normative Orders, 6 INT’L J. OF CON. L. 373 (2008); John Linarelli, Analytical Jurisprudence and the 
Concept of Commercial Law, 114 PENN ST. L.R. 129 (2009). 
124 See e.g. Michael F. Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic 
Laws in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT’L. L. 729 (1987); Michael Joachim Bonell, International 
Uniform Law in Practice – Or Where the Real Trouble Begins, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 865 (1990); Larry A. 
DiMatteo, The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG 
Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L. & BUS. 299 (2004); Paul Schiff Berman, The Inevitable Legal Pluralism 
Within Universal Harmonization Regimes: The Case of the CISG, 2016 UNIF. L. REV. 1 (offering various 
accounts of the generic problem of divergent judicial interpretation of uniform law among different 
interpretive communities).  
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Nevertheless, it reinforces the point that “glocal” judges have a multifaceted status as 
domesticators and shapers of international norms.125  
Faced with the domestic-international hybridity of a Model Law enactment what 
can we expect “glocal” judges to do? To arrive at an answer we need some basic 
understanding of their incentives126 and how they conceive of their own role, consciously 
or unconsciously as frontline actors. As regards incentives, we might expect judges to be 
motivated by a mixture of institutional and personal factors: preservation of judicial 
independence, fidelity to the law and to their oath, judicial economy (including effective 
management of cases, dockets, and workload), career progression, and reputation. As 
regards their role in mediating between the international and domestic planes, 
“universalism versus territorialism” provides one possible conceptual frame but it is 
crude and quickly collapses into modified universalism’s unspecific “they should 
cooperate as far as they are able”.127 Let me make the assumption that most judges will 
                                                        
125 See Roberts, supra note 120, 59-60, 61-64 (discussing how the duality of domestic court decisions 
creates ambiguity about the actual and appropriate role of national courts and may lead to divergent 
interpretations of the content of international law due, in part, to national courts having different 
perceptions of their own role in the reception and application of international law). See also Stephane 
Beaulac, Thinking Outside the “Westphalian Box”: Dualism, Legal Interpretation and the Contextual 
Argument in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANTHOLOGY (Eriksen & Emberland eds. 2010). 
126 See e.g. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013); Renée 
Cohn Jubelirer, The Behavior of Federal Judges: The “Careerist” In Robes, 97 JUDICATURE 98 (2013). 
Of course, incentives may differ among judges in the same legal system (e.g. between elected and 
unelected judges and between life-tenured Article 3 and fixed term Article 1 federal judges in the US) and 
among judges in different legal systems. My brief sketch of incentives in the text is biased towards the 
global north, which reflects my priors.  
127 See, e.g. Jay L. Westbrook, Multinational Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, the ALI 
Principles, and the EU Insolvency Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 9 (2002) (“The universalists respond 
to the pragmatic argument of the territorialists with ‘modified universalism’. There is no doubt that national 
insolvency laws differ greatly, especially as to priority in distribution, and that these differences will 
continue to exist for some time. Modified universalism responds to this difficulty by proposing a pragmatic 
development of universalism, moving toward the ultimate goal within the practical limits established by the 
markets and by local laws at any particular time and place. But to say this position is pragmatic is not to say 
it lacks principle or direction. On a national legislative level, it presses for less rigid rules for multinational 
debtors. Under existing laws, it adopts a worldwide perspective that seeks results as close to those 
achievable under a true universalism as national laws will permit in the circumstances of each case.”); 
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care most deeply about fidelity to the law and the avoidance of time consuming 
jurisdictional conflicts (economy or, more crudely, docket management). If that 
assumption holds most of the time, courts will try to give effect to the cooperative spirit 
of the local enactment having regard to permissible sources (which include the Model 
Law, the Guide to Enactment, and, via Article 8, foreign court determinations) but they 
will necessarily pay close attention to the manner of implementation and how the local 
enactment fits in with, or alters, pre-existing local law. In short, judges may well be 
outward looking and inclined to cooperate in a broad sense but their response to specific 
requests for discretionary relief will inevitably be conditioned by locally configured 
leeways. 
The Model Law’s combination of choice-of-law neutrality and flexibility 
(flexibility both in the sense that it can be customized by legislatures to fit the local 
system and in the sense that it contains general standards and confers judicial discretion), 
and its built-in concessions to local interests make it susceptible to divergent readings 
within and across legal systems. These aspects are a feature rather than a bug. 
Universalists crave bold judges who will appeal to norms of international cooperation 
embedded in the legislative purposes of Model Law enactments to overcome domestic 
roadblocks. However, even though Model Law enactments internalize international 
norms and gesture towards harmonized interpretation through the soft mandate of Article 
8,128 and non-prescriptive practice guidance issued by UNCITRAL,129 many judges will 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Westbrook, National Regulation, supra note 5, 779 (“…advocates of universalism generally support 
modified universalism, a process in which courts within various countries cooperate to achieve a result as 
close to the ideal as circumstances and existing domestic law permit.”). 
128 The language of Article 8 directs judges to have regard to its international origin and to the need to 
promote uniformity. I argue in Section III.D., infra, that Article 8 creates a norm of engagement with 
foreign legal sources but one that is insufficient to displace domestic norms. 
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struggle to give such general norms priority over highly specific domestic rules. General 
norms and soft mandates will not override rules that carry authoritative weight under 
domestic rules of recognition (in the positivist sense). On issues where the Model Law 
creates judicial leeway, its choice-of-law neutrality provides no concrete guide to 
decision. Some judges in some systems may incline towards a universalist reading of the 
local enactment. Other judges will worry about the lack of any clear normative hierarchy 
mandating them to prioritize universalist forms of cooperation, especially in systems that 
traditionally favor application of local bankruptcy law.130 It is no surprise, then, that 
Model Law enactments, as some legal unification skeptics predicted at the outset, yield 
mixed results from a universalist perspective.131  
This account of interlegality and the role of domestic courts as receivers and 
shapers of international norms does not resolve much. But its greater sensitivity to the 
task confronting judges provides a loose frame for understanding how Model Law 
enactments are handled, and why practice may diverge within and across legal 
systems.132 Moreover, it implies that interlegality could be resolved in manifold ways 
                                                                                                                                                                     
129 See U.N. COMM ON INT’L TRADE LAW MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: THE 
JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, (updated 2013); U.N. COMM ON INT’L TRADE LAW, PRACTICE GUIDE ON 
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY COOPERATION, U.N. Sales No. E.10.V.6 (2010). 
130 Contrast, for example, the normative hierarchy in systems of supranational law such as EU law that are 
constitutionalized in ways that require national courts to give primacy to supranational law over conflicting 
domestic law. On the primacy of EU law over national law, see Case C-6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] 
E.C.R. 585 (European Court of Justice). On the problems associated with incomplete hierarchies of 
normative authority see Walker, supra note 123. 
131 See Paul D. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 
39 VA. J. INT’L. L. 743, 785 (1999). Stephan argues in favor of clear and precise choice-of-law rules: id. at 
748. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice-of-Law 
Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 23 (2000) also favors an explicit choice-of-law approach. I am 
skeptical about choice-of-law harmonization unless it is layered on deeper, pre-existing foundations of 
international cooperation and integration because of the concern that states will not buy in. Even in EU law, 
the exceptions to the lex concursus dwarf the rule. Because of the trade-offs involved I also think that 
legislatures have comparative advantages in devising choice-of-law rule and exception frameworks or in 
codifying existing market trends.  
132 Pottow, Greed and Pride, supra note 115, argues that states have an interest in applying local law for 
local law’s sake independent of whether this confers any quantifiable benefit on private local actors. Hence 
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leading to hybridity (approaches that prioritize international norms over domestic norms; 
approaches that prioritize domestic norms over international norms; various strains in 
between).  The account also illustrates that international insolvency law scholarship needs 
to pay systematic attention to institutional factors, including local legislative 
implementation and judicial agency, so as to bridge the gap between its system design 
theories and the actualization of those theories in practice. 
 
III. ANGLO-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH MODEL LAW ENACTMENTS  
 
The Model Law was enacted into US law as chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code 
with effect from October 17, 2005.133 The following year, the Model Law was enacted 
into British law by the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (“CBIR”). 134 
Ostensibly, in transposing the law, both the US and UK stayed close to the Model Law’s 
text in accordance with the Guide to Enactment’s recommendation “that States make as 
few changes as possible in incorporating the Model Law into their legal systems.”135 
                                                                                                                                                                     
he distinguishes “greed” (a creditor preference for the highest possible payout) from “pride” (a state’s 
vindication of regulatory sovereignty over assets it can plausibly claim to control). My conception of 
judging maps somewhat onto Pottow’s notion of pride, although I prefer to characterize judicial incentives 
in terms of local legal culture and felt institutional constraint rather than parochialism. To my mind, judges 
can hardly be criticized for seeking to be faithful to shared understandings of local legislative intent.  
133 Bankruptcy Abuse Protection and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8 §§ 801, 1501(a) 
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1532 (2012)). 
134 S.I. 2006 No. 1030. The CBIR have force in the two jurisdictions in Great Britain, i.e. (i) Scotland and 
(ii) England and Wales. The Model Law was separately enacted in virtually identical terms in the UK’s 
third constituent jurisdiction, Northern Ireland, by the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations (Northern 
Ireland) 2007, S.I. 2007 No. 115 (N.I.) pursuant to Northern Ireland’s devolution arrangements.  
135 GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, para.20. On US fidelity to the Model Law text see In re Condor 
Ins. Ltd., 601 F.3d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 2010) (“…Chapter 15 closely hewed to the text of the [Model 
Law]…); Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 7, 720 (“Any departures from the actual text of the 
Model Law in its official English version were as narrow and limited as possible. In only one or two 
respects were those departures meant to make any substantive change and those instances were specifically 
identified.”). On UK fidelity to the Model Law text see THE INSOLVENCY SERVICE, IMPLEMENTATION 
OF UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY IN GREAT BRITAIN (2005) [hereinafter 
UK CONSULTATION DOCUMENT] at para.21 (“The Model Law is a legislative text that forms the basis of 
a recommendation to States for incorporation into their national law. When drafting the articles, we have 
tried to stay as close to the drafting in the Model Law as possible to try and ensure consistency, certainty 
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However, this apparent shared fidelity to the Model Law text masks significant 
differences in the structure, language, and normative underpinnings of US and UK cross-
border insolvency law.  
The divergence between the systems has two related implications. The first is that 
subtle differences in local implementation and local context, amplified by “glocal” 
judging, will reinforce divergence. The second, which grows out of the first, is that 
Model Law enactments will inevitably germinate local hybrids, reinforced by local legal 
culture, that present challenges for universalism’s harmonization agenda.  This section 
accounts for the divergence and teases out these implications further. What emerges is 
that the US under chapter 15 takes a unilateral approach to international cooperation that 
conforms broadly to what I have characterized as a strong, American, version of modified 
universalism, albeit with some lines of resistance that prioritize the text of local law over 
the text and purpose of the Model Law. The CBIR, by contrast, is one strand of a “third 
country” regime within a complex, multi-tiered system of UK cross-border insolvency 
law in which other elements of the system (the EU Insolvency Regulation and section 
426 of the UK’s Insolvency Act) have pronounced multilateralist features. “British” 
modified universalism may be of the same genus as its American counterpart, but it is a 
different species. And judges have plausibly interpreted the CBIR to protect this species 
from extinction. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and harmonisation with other States enacting the Model Law and to provide a guide for other States who 
are considering enacting the law. Our policy has been to try and enact as drafted, which may result in the 
use of some terms, which may not be standard in British insolvency law.”). 
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A. Manner of enactment: structural and textual aspects of Anglo-US reception of 
  the Model Law 
 
Both countries signaled that they favored a “copy out” mode of enactment and 
both countries’ enactments acknowledge their international origins while closely tracking 
the Model Law’s core structure and provisions. Nonetheless, there are important 
differences between chapter 15 and the CBIR. I focus on three in particular: (i) the 
different structure and contours of US and UK cross-border insolvency law; (ii) the 
variable emphasis on comity in the enactments; and (iii) the different approaches to 
implementation of Article 23 of the Model Law which provide a window on divergent 
Anglo-US responses to the Model Law’s choice-of-law neutrality.136  
 
1. Single portal (US) versus multiple portals (UK) 
 
The US incorporated the Model Law within the Bankruptcy Code and consciously 
created a single federal gateway to international insolvency cooperation. The Bankruptcy 
Code is the sole, exclusive source of, and authority for, US federal judicial assistance of 
foreign representatives and the bankruptcy courts act as gatekeepers to the US legal 
system as a whole.137 Moreover, the US venue rules prescribe that a chapter 15 case will 
take place in a single venue.138 Thus, the US departed from its practice under section 304 
by channeling access to US system-wide cooperation through a single federal bankruptcy 
court.139 The recognition process in chapter 15 is the key that unlocks the door. Once a 
                                                        
136 For other discussions from a UK perspective of divergence in Anglo-US Model Law enactments see 
Gerard McCormack, COMI and Comity in UK and US Insolvency Law, 128 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 140 
(2012); US Exceptionalism and UK Localism? Cross-Border Insolvency in Comparative Perspective, 36 
LEGAL STUDIES 136 (2016). 
137 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1504, 1509; Gilhuly et al, supra note 18, 79-80. 
138 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), (b)(1), (b)(2)(P), 1410, 1412.  
139 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 108, 110 (“Subsections (b)(2), (b)(3), and (c) [of § 1509] make it clear that 
chapter 15 is intended to be the exclusive door to ancillary assistance to foreign proceedings. The goal is to 
concentrate control of these questions in one court… This section concentrates the recognition and 
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foreign proceeding is recognized in chapter 15, the foreign representative has standing 
and authority throughout the US system, including the right to commence a full 
bankruptcy case under chapter 7 or chapter 11.140 
The CBIR were enacted as secondary legislation under ministerial powers created 
by the Insolvency Act 2000.141 They cross-reference the Insolvency Act 1986, the UK’s 
primary domestic insolvency law, but are otherwise free standing. They also have a 
gateway feature – the foreign representative’s access to judicial assistance throughout the 
British legal system is channeled through Chancery Division of the High Court in 
England and Wales and the Court of Session in Scotland142 – but the CBIR are far from 
being the only source of cross-border insolvency law.  
UK cross-border insolvency law has evolved in the manner of a medieval church 
with new parts being added at various times without any great concern for the 
architectural unity of the edifice as a whole. The CBIR is the most recent addition to that 
edifice. This source of cross-border insolvency law co-exists with the common law of 
judicial assistance (which includes the English doctrine of ancillary winding up), the 
statutory regime in section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986, and the EU Insolvency 
Regulation. I have referred to this elsewhere as a “menu” of different options for foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                     
deference process in one United States court, ensures against abuse, and empowers a court that will be fully 
informed of the current status of all foreign proceedings involving the debtor.”). 
140 11 U.S.C. §§ 1509(b), 1511, 1512, 1524, 1528. A foreign representative can get access to US courts for 
narrow purposes without recognition: see 11 U.S.C. 1509(f) (foreign representative’s right to collect or 
recover a claim which is property of the debtor without commencing a case or obtaining recognition under 
chapter 15). Legislative history characterizes this as a “limited exception to the prior recognition 
requirement” that allows a foreign representative to collect assets such as account receivables: HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 108, 110-11. See also In re Iida, 377 B.R. 243, 258 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007); In re Loy, 
380 B.R. 154, 164 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). 
141 Insolvency Act 2000 § 14 (c.39) (UK). 
142 CBIR, reg. 2(1), sch. 1, art. 2. The articles in Schedule 1 of the CBIR correspond numerically to the 
articles in the Model Law. For ease, hereafter I will cite directly to the articles, e.g. CBIR, art.1. 
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representatives.143 But it is not an à la carte menu. Indeed, UK cross-border insolvency 
law is better thought of as being like a building with four rooms in which access to each 
room depends on the identity of the country where the insolvency proceeding is taking 
place.  
Each one of these cross-border insolvency regimes has discrete parameters of 
application. The EU Insolvency Regulation applies only where the debtor has its COMI 
in an EU member state.144 Letters of request for assistance under section 426 can only be 
entertained from the courts of designated countries having jurisdiction that corresponds to 
UK courts’ subject matter jurisdiction in relation to insolvency law.145 Section 426 is a 
“favored nation” regime and the countries designated for special treatment all have some 
historic connection with the UK.146 Significantly, the US is not designated for section 426 
purposes. 
While discrete, the various regimes are not mutually exclusive. A United States 
bankruptcy trustee could seek judicial assistance at common law and/or under the CBIR. 
An Australian or Canadian foreign representative could have recourse to the common 
law, the CBIR, and/or section 426. But this lack of exclusivity begs questions about the 
                                                        
143 See Adrian Walters, Giving Effect to Foreign Restructuring Plans in Anglo-US Private International 
Law, 3 NOTT. INSOLV. & BUS. L. e-J. 375, 390, 391 (2015) [hereinafter Giving Effect to Foreign 
Restructuring Plans] and The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and the UK, 36 COMP. 
LAW 261 (2015). 
144 See EU INSOLVENCY REGULATION, supra note 1, recital (25). 
145 Insolvency Act 1986 § 426(1), (4), (10), (11) (c.45) (UK). 
146 Insolvency Act 1986 § 426(1) provides for internal cooperation among the constituent jurisdictions of 
the United Kingdom. Insolvency Act 1986 § 426(11)(a) designates the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, 
which are Crown dependencies, as § 426 territories. The following countries or territories are designated by 
statutory instruments pursuant to delegated legislative powers in § 426(11)(b): Anguilla, Australia, the 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Botswana, British Virgin Islands, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Cayman Islands, 
Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Republic of Ireland, Malaysia, Montserrat, New Zealand, South 
Africa, Saint Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Tuvalu. See Cooperation of Insolvency Courts 
(Designation of Relevant Countries and Territories) Orders of 1986 (S.I. 1986/2123), 1996 (S.I. 1996/253), 
and 1998 (S.I. 1998/2766). All of these countries and territories have at least one (in some cases more than 
one) of the following attributes: (i) formerly subject to British rule; (ii) member of the Commonwealth; (iii) 
British Overseas Territory. All have legal systems that are based on English common law. 
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interactions between each regime and the overall coherence of the law as a whole. It is 
clear that the EU Insolvency Regulation applies to the exclusion of the other regimes to 
cases falling within its scope, 147  and that the CBIR do not affect the continuing 
application of the common law and section 426.148 How the approach under one regime 
might affect the approach under the other regimes is left to the courts.  
Another way to characterize UK cross-border insolvency law is as a tripartite, 
semi-hierarchical system that has one set of rules for the EU, a second set of rules for 
section 426 countries, and a third set of rules, the CBIR and common law, for “third 
countries”, i.e. non-EU, non-426 countries. The EU Insolvency Regulation has express 
choice-of-law rules that apply the “home” country insolvency law subject to a raft of 
carve-outs. 149  Moreover, it is binding supranational law underpinned by treaty and 
grounded in norms of mutual trust and reciprocity. Section 426(5) of the Insolvency Act 
empowers the UK court to apply the insolvency law applicable by either the UK court or 
the requesting court in relation to comparable matters falling within its jurisdiction.150 
Section 426 is also a reciprocity-based regime with what amounts to a system 
accreditation feature. The countries designated by statutory instrument are countries that 
                                                        
147 This is the effect of the European Communities Act 1972 §§ 2(1), (4), 3(1) combined with the doctrine 
of EU law primacy developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. See Case C-6/64, Costa v. 
ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585 (European Court of Justice); Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, [1970] E.C.R. 1125 (European Court of 
Justice); Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, [1978] E.C.R. 629 
(European Court of Justice); Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd. (No. 2), 
[1991] 1 A.C. 603, 658G-659C,  (European Court of Justice and UK House of Lords). See also CBIR, art. 
3. 
148 CBIR, art. 7 (not precluding court from providing assistance under other laws of Great Britain); UK 
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 135, paras. 40-43. 
149 See EU INSOLVENCY REGULATION, supra note 1, arts. 7-18, 35. The opening of secondary 
proceedings based on an establishment also triggers an exception to the main proceeding choice-of-law rule 
as regards assets situated within the territorial scope of the secondary proceedings. Id, arts. 7, 34-35. 
150 Insolvency Act 1986 § 426(5) (c.45) (UK). The willingness of the UK bench and bar to use the § 426 
jurisdiction creatively is illustrated by cases such as In re Tambrook Jersey Ltd, [2013] EWCA Civ 576, 
[2014] Ch 252. 
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the UK’s executive branch has determined will afford the same favorable treatment to 
requests for assistance from UK courts as UK courts afford to courts in designated 
countries. It is no coincidence that section 426 countries are all from the British common 
law world. The historic relationships between the legal systems of the UK and the section 
426 countries provide the basic foundation for a reciprocal approach. Section 426 may 
appear unilateral insofar as it mandates the UK court to assist a court of corresponding 
jurisdiction in a designated country. But the statutory mandate is underpinned by a 
system of accreditation in which the executive and legislative branches pre-determine 
which countries qualify for assistance based on a guarantee of reciprocal treatment. 
In the UK, then, the CBIR and the common law together constitute a body of 
cross-border insolvency law that applies to requests for assistance originating from non-
EU, non-426 “third countries”. The CBIR upgraded but did not fully codify this “third 
country” regime. The common law therefore continues to apply and the courts are left to 
determine how the CBIR and common law should interact.151 Moreover, the CBIR, like 
US chapter 15, are unilateral in character. Thus, under the CBIR a UK court is bound to 
recognize a foreign main proceeding if it meets the eligibility criteria for recognition 
regardless of whether the foreign court would recognize a UK proceeding, subject only to 
the public policy exception. This matters because it means that the CBIR differ 
normatively from the two other legislative regimes. By contrast, the EU and section 426 
regimes are underpinned by strong reciprocity norms generated through pre-existing 
inter-country legal and structural relationships of various kinds.  
 
                                                        
151 For example, Parliament did not address the relationship between the “third country” cross-border 
insolvency regime and the statutory and common law rules on recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
ordinary civil litigation when it enacted the CBIR. See infra discussion of Rubin in Section III.C.2.b. 
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2. Textual commitment to comity (US) versus textual silence on comity (UK) 
 
The US version of the Model Law in chapter 15 expresses a clear statutory 
commitment to comity whereas the CBIR, consistent with the text of the Model Law, 
make no mention of comity. Take, for example, the manner in which the two countries 
have enacted Article 9 of the Model Law. The CBIR tracks the single sentence of Article 
9 verbatim: “A foreign representative is entitled to apply directly to a court in Great 
Britain.” However, section 1509 of the Bankruptcy Code creates a system of access that, 
subject to recognition, confers broad entitlements on the foreign representative including, 
in section 1509(b)(3) an express entitlement to “comity or cooperation.”  The U.S.’s 
idiosyncratic enactment of Article 7 in section 1507 also requires courts, among other 
things, to act “consistent with principles of comity” in granting additional assistance to 
foreign representatives. Legislative history and subsequent chapter 15 jurisprudence 
indicate that, subject to the requirement of recognition, the US sought to preserve 
established forms of relief that courts had granted under section 304 guided by principles 
of comity.152  
The difference is subtle. It does not mean that the UK pays no attention to comity, 
a well-established common law doctrine.153 But in the UK’s statutory edifice, which as 
                                                        
152 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 108, 109, 116; In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 404 B.R. 726, 738-739 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“…[M]any of the principles underlying section 304 remain in effect under chapter 
15. Significantly, chapter 15 specifically contemplates that the court should be guided by principles of 
comity and cooperation with foreign courts in deciding whether to grant the foreign representative 
additional post-recognition relief. This is evidenced by the pervasiveness with which comity appears in 
chapter 15’s provisions…In short, while chapter 15 replaced section 304 and provided a more structured 
framework for recognizing foreign proceedings, Congress specifically granted courts discretion to fashion 
appropriate post-recognition relief, consistent with principles underlying section 304.”); In re Condor Ins. 
Ltd., 601 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Congress intended that case law under section 304 apply unless 
contradicted by Chapter 15.”); Gilhuly et al, supra note 18, 53-56. 
153 See Lawrence Collins, Comity in Modern Private International Law in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (J.J. Fawcett ed. 2002) 89; Adrian Briggs, The Principle of Comity in 
Private International Law, 354 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE 
ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (2012).  
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outlined above also includes two reciprocity-based legislative regimes, there is no 
reference to comity, whereas it is carried over from prior US law and embedded in US 
chapter 15. There is no question that UK courts could make use of the doctrine to flesh 
out Model Law principles of cooperation.154 However, as much ground is now occupied 
by statutory schemes of one sort or another, comity in the UK is a residuum. The variance 
in emphasis on comity in the UK and US Model Law enactments therefore matters. In the 
US scheme it is an anchor principle that animates a single body of cross-border 
insolvency law.155 In the UK scheme it is a common law footnote156 to a complex body of 
mainly statutory law much of which rests on deep foundations of international 
cooperation based on treaties or other reciprocal ties. 
 
3. The great divide: Articles 23, 21, and divergent responses to choice-of-law 
neutrality 
 
The US enactment of Article 23 is exceptional and the difference between the US 
approach and that of other countries, including the UK, is symptomatic of a wider 
structural divergence between US and UK conceptions of modified universalism and of 
                                                        
154 Indeed, UNCITRAL hoped that the principles of cooperation in Articles 25-27 of the Model Law would 
provide a statutory foundation upon which comity could operate more concretely in cross-border 
insolvencies in countries where the doctrine is used as a legal basis for international cooperation. See 
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, para.214. 
155 See Martin & Speckhart, CHAPTER 15 FOR FOREIGN DEBTORS, supra note 18, 140-41 (on the 
pervasiveness of comity in chapter 15). See also In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V., 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012) 
at 1043 (“[c]entral to Chapter 15 is comity…”),  1044 (“[w]ithin the context of Chapter 15…[comity] is 
raised to a principal objective”), 1045, 1047, 1053 (comity described as a “central tenet” of chapter 15; 
reference also to chapter 15’s “heavy emphasis on comity”); In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 404 B.R. 726, 738 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[o]nce a case is recognized as a foreign proceeding, chapter 15 specifically 
contemplates that the court will exercise its discretion consistent with principles of comity”). Comity is 
acknowledged to be a foundational principle of American private international law. See Joel R. Paul, The 
Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 19 (2008); Donald Earl Childress 
III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 
(2010); William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
156 On English dismissiveness of comity as an independent basis for judicial decision in the realm of private 
international law see Collins, supra note 153, 91-94; Briggs, supra note 153, 80-81.  
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the role of a local ancillary insolvency proceeding.  Article 23 provides that on 
recognition of a foreign proceeding, the foreign representative has standing to initiate 
avoidance actions available under local law to a person or body administering a 
reorganization or liquidation. UNCITRAL had in mind the suite of avoidance powers that 
insolvency laws commonly grant to trustees to enable them to set aside pre-insolvency 
transactions that are detrimental to creditors such as unfair preferences or fraudulent 
transfers.  
The CBIR enact Article 23 as written and add modifications dealing primarily 
with applicable claw back periods to ensure that Article 23 actions mesh properly with 
the UK Insolvency Act avoiding powers regime. Thus, the CBIR track the Model Law in 
permitting the foreign representative to pursue statutory avoidance actions that under 
local law can usually only be pursued by a local officeholder in a local insolvency 
proceeding.157 
In stark contrast, the US version of Article 23 in section 1523 of the Code confers 
standing on the foreign representative of a recognized foreign proceeding to initiate 
avoidance actions but only in a full bankruptcy case under chapter 7 or 11. Accordingly, 
section 1521(a)(7) precludes the court from granting relief under the main Code avoiding 
powers as discretionary relief. Thus, a foreign representative must seek recognition under 
chapter 15 and then commence an involuntary bankruptcy case under chapter 7 or 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code pursuant to section 303(b)(4) in order to make use of US avoiding 
powers. This approach was born of concerns raised by the US delegation to UNCITRAL 
that the Model Law’s limited grant of standing left complex questions of appropriate 
                                                        
157 See GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras. 201, 203. 
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forum and choice-of-law entirely at large158 and reflects the strongly held US view that 
avoiding powers are so integral a part of a insolvency law’s distributional scheme that 
avoidance and distributional rules should derive from the same system of law.159  
At first blush, the difference appears slight. All Article 23 does is confer 
procedural standing on the foreign representative. It is choice-of-law neutral and 
therefore neutral as to the foreign representative’s substantive rights.160 Article 23 of the 
CBIR would not preclude a UK court from denying a foreign representative relief under 
English avoiding powers on English choice-of-law grounds. But if we scratch the surface, 
the difference over Article 23 points to a more fundamental difference in the choice-of-
law orientation of US and UK cross-border insolvency law in practice.  
The Model Law was drafted on the basis of an agreed principle that recognition 
should have its own effects and should not directly import the consequences of foreign 
law into the local insolvency system.161 Choice-of-law neutrality is fundamental to the 
design – a feature not a bug. It implements a legislative compromise that perpetuates the 
divergent viewpoints on choice-of-law that made the compromise necessary in the first 
place. The leeway the Model Law affords countries to prevent infiltration of foreign law 
from legal systems in which they may not have full confidence is one of its major selling 
points.162 The possibility of determining the effects of recognition by reference to foreign 
law, local law or, akin to section 426(5) of the UK Insolvency Act, in accordance with 
                                                        
158 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 108, 116. 
159 In re Condor Ins. Ltd., 601 F.3d 319, 323-327 (5th Cir. 2010); Jay L. Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance 
Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 499 (1991). 
160 GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, para.201; In re Condor Ins. Ltd., 601 F.3d 319, 323-324, 326-
327 (5th Cir. 2010). 
161 GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, paras. 35, 178. 
162 See Zoltán Fábok, International Insolvency Law in the New Hungarian PIL Code, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2919047 at 5.4. 
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either foreign or local law, was canvassed at UNCITRAL but rejected.163 UNCITRAL 
decided instead to include a short list of autonomous effects in Article 20, designed to 
provide immediate protection for locally situated assets, which would be triggered 
automatically by recognition of a foreign main proceeding, while giving courts leeway in 
Article 21 to grant additional discretionary relief. 164  Taken as a package of relief 
measures, Articles 20, 21 and 23 thus contain no express choice-of-law rules. 
Leeways inevitably permit a range of possible decisional outcomes. One effect of 
choice-of-law neutrality is that it suppresses choice-of-law analysis even where the 
question before the court has choice-of-law implications. 165  Another effect is that it 
leaves judges to construe the local enactment by reference to their sense of the local legal 
framework as a whole. Courts could choose to apply the law of the foreign proceeding as 
a default choice-of-law rule.166 But it does not necessarily follow. Faced with choice-of-
law neutrality, “glocal” judges could equally well look to local law, including local 
private international law, and local legal tradition for clues. And, in the UK’s complex 
body of cross-border insolvency law, there are mixed choice-of-law messages that make 
narrow readings of parliamentary intent entirely plausible.  
As outlined above in Section III.A.1, the EU and section 426 regimes contain 
express choice-of-law rules that either mandate application of foreign law subject to 
carve-outs or permit reference to foreign law. Significantly, however, the tradition in the 
English common law is for assistance to the foreign representative to be provided either 
                                                        
163 See Clift, Choice of Law, supra note 26, 28-30. 
164 See id. 
165 See Gropper, Curious Disappearance, supra note 74. 
166 See id., 160-64, 178-79. 
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through the mechanism of an ancillary winding up167 or otherwise by reference to the 
domestic law that would apply were a local insolvency proceeding to be commenced.168 
One structural question in UK law therefore is how far does the Model Law alter the pre-
existing common law position. The CBIR’s enactment of Article 23 suggests that one 
plausible answer is “not much.” The UK’s Article 23 cleaves to the tradition that the UK 
courts provide assistance to a foreign representative under domestic law through an 
ancillary English insolvency proceeding while relaxing the requirement for the foreign 
representative to commence a full UK parallel proceeding in order to gain access to UK 
avoiding powers. That tradition is further exemplified by the language of Article 21(1)(g) 
of the CBIR which, read together with the opening sentence of Article 21, states that “the 
court may…grant any appropriate relief, including…granting any additional relief that 
may be available to a British insolvency officeholder under the law of Great Britain…”.  
In the British common law world, the question of whether, and to what extent, a local 
court will grant relief to a foreign representative by reference to foreign law is far from 
settled.169  
 
                                                        
167 See Phillip St. J. Smart, International Insolvency: Ancillary Winding Up and the Foreign Corporation, 
39 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 827 (1990); Andrew Godwin et al, The Inherent Power of Common Law Courts to 
Provide Assistance in Cross-Border Insolvencies: From Comity to Complexity, 26 INT’L. INSOLV. REV. 5,  
12-13 (2017). 
168 See FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 27, 185-88, especially 
at 187 (“The powerful grip of the lex fori upon the main structure of the insolvency process is seemingly 
unshakeable.).  
169 Even in Cambridge Gas Transport Corp v. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator 
Holdings plc, [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 508, [22], the high watermark of judicial support for 
universalism in the UK, Lord Hoffmann doubted whether common law assistance, as distinct from 
assistance under §426, “could take the form of applying provisions of the foreign insolvency law which 
form no part of the domestic system.” See further Justice Steven Rares, Consistency and Conflict – Cross-
Border Insolvency, [2015] FED. J. SCHOL. 14 at para. 3 (“However, the legal basis on, and extent to, which 
the Court of the forum will depart from its local law in co-operating with the law of an insolvent’s domicile 
or centre of main interests is not settled…”) (Justice Rares is a judge in the Federal Court of Australia). See 
also Picard v. Primeo, Cayman Islands Court of Appeal, April 16, 2014 (court finding statutory authority 
to apply Cayman transaction avoidance provisions but not foreign avoidance provisions).  
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B. Normative continuities and discontinuities in the Anglo-US reception of the Model 
Law: a summary 
 
The structural differences in the US and UK enactments reflect subtle normative 
differences. The US has a single federal body of cross-border insolvency law in chapter 
15 animated by comity. There is normative continuity with former section 304, including 
some willingness among judges to grant relief to foreign representatives by reference to 
foreign law and thus some inclination to resolve the Model Law’s choice-of-law 
neutrality in favor of foreign law that is in keeping with a strong version of modified 
universalism. 170  Comity is channeled through the statute and subjected to various 
statutory constraints – the threshold requirements for recognition in sections 1515-1517, 
the public policy exception in section 1506, and the concept of sufficient protection in 
sections 1521-1522.171 In embracing the Model Law, the US has signaled that it will act 
unilaterally in the hope that other countries will follow suit and so engender a multilateral 
approach to international insolvency cooperation by means other than a convention.  
By contrast, UK cross-border insolvency law lacks a unitary approach. The UK 
currently has four cross-border insolvency regimes, two of which (the EU Insolvency 
Regulation and section 426) are grounded in pre-existing legal orderings172 that have 
strong normative foundations of mutual recognition and reciprocity. The remaining two – 
                                                        
170 Though as Allan Gropper points out chapter 15 does constrain the US court’s authority to enforce the lex 
concursus by the requirements in §§1521(b) and 1522(a) that the court be satisfied that parties in interest 
are sufficiently protected and by the enumerated factors conditioning a grant of additional assistance in 
§1507: see Gropper, Curious Disappearance, supra note 74, 163-76. See also Clift, Choice of Law, supra 
note 26, 26-31 (characterizing the COMI test as a choice of forum rule that encourages a degree of 
deference to the foreign law of the main insolvency proceeding “…qualified by the public policy exception 
of article 6, the requirement to consider whether the interests of local creditors are adequately protected 
under article 21(2), and by the provisions of articles 28 and 29 that preserve the pre-eminence of local 
proceedings over any foreign proceeding…”). 
171 Id. 
172 Rubin v. Eurofinance SA; New Cap Insurance Corpn Ltd v. Grant, [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 A.C. 236, 
[25] (per Lord Collins: “Consequently, there are four main methods under English law for assisting 
insolvency proceedings in other jurisdictions, two of which are part of regionally or internationally agreed 
schemes.”). 
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the CBIR and the common law – comprise the law applicable to requests for judicial 
assistance emanating from foreign representatives in third countries. The orientation of 
the CBIR – as reflected in the UK’s enactment of Article 23 and Article 21(1)(g) – is 
outward looking and yet rooted in the tradition of the common law ancillary winding up 
in which UK courts will grant assistance insofar as it would be available in an English 
insolvency proceeding under English law. Thus, the inclination of the UK’s third country 
regime is to resolve the Model Law’s choice-of-law neutrality by defaulting to English 
law and mimicking the effects of a local parallel ancillary insolvency proceeding. 
Moreover, the structure of UK cross-border insolvency law as a whole inclines courts 
towards textual rather than policy or system oriented readings of the CBIR. 
 
C. “Glocal” judges and the Model Law  
  
1. “Glocal” judging in the US  
 
The prevalence of comity in US foreign relations law 173  and cross-border 
insolvency law, and the continuity between former section 304 and chapter 15, inclines 
the US towards an unarticulated but functional universalist choice-of-law rule. This is 
evident in the tendency of US courts to give effect to foreign moratoria174 and discharge 
injunctions175 and to permit actions in the US under foreign avoiding powers176 subject 
                                                        
173 See William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
174 See In re Sanjel (USA) Inc., 2016 WL 4427075 (Bankr. W.D. Texas, 2016) (recognition order giving 
effect to stay in Canadian foreign proceedings pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a)(1)).  
175 See, e.g., In re Avanti Communications Group Plc, 582 B.R. 603, 605 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(“Recognition and enforcement of schemes of arrangement sanctioned by UK courts has become 
commonplace in chapter 15 cases…”); In re Energy Coal S.P.A., 582 B.R. 619 (Bankr. D. Delaware, 2018) 
(injunction in support of restructuring plan following recognition of Italian concordato preventivo). See 
also Walters, Giving Effect to Foreign Restructuring Plans, supra note 143 (noting at 390 n.72 continuity 
in US practice traceable back to the Supreme Court decision in Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 
109 U.S. 527 (1883)). 
176 See In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 404 B.R. 726, 744 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Condor Ins. Ltd., 601 
F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010); In re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA, 535 B.R. 543 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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only to the public policy exception in section 1506 and other conditioning provisions in 
chapter 15. It is evident too in section 1521(a)(7)’s bar on foreign representative’s having 
access to US avoiding powers. An implicit assumption is that the law of the foreign 
proceeding should provide the starting point in the absence of express contrary 
stipulation. So while section 1520 defines the automatic effects of recognition by 
reference to US law, US courts have extended the scope of the automatic stay by giving 
US effect to the foreign law stay in the exercise of their discretion under section 
1521(a)(1).177  Relatedly, in In re Condor Insurance Ltd, the Fifth Circuit inferred from 
the purpose, structure, and international origins of chapter 15 that by denying foreign 
representatives standing to sue under US avoiding powers in sections 1521(a)(7) and 
section 1523, Congress did not intend to prevent US courts from applying the avoidance 
law of the foreign proceeding.178 Thus, the court’s authority in section 1521(a) to grant 
“any appropriate relief” was sufficiently wide to permit a foreign representative from 
Saint Kitts and Nevis to pursue an avoidance action in the US under Nevis law.  
US courts have also routinely given effect in the US to the foreign law effects of 
foreign reorganization plans thus binding parties subject to US jurisdiction without any 
need for confirmation of a parallel chapter 11 plan.179  In so doing, US courts have 
endorsed features of foreign plans, such as non-party releases, that would likely be 
                                                        
177 See, e.g., In re Sanjel (USA) Inc., 2016 WL 4427075 (Bankr. W.D. Texas, 2016); In re Daebo 
International Shipping Co., Ltd., 543 B.R. 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015); Collins v. Oilsands Quest Inc., 484 
B.R. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
178 601 F.3d 319, 324-328 (5th Cir. 2010). This willingness to apply foreign law appears to reflect practice 
under the prior law in 11 U.S.C. §304. See e.g. In re Board of Directors of Multicanal, S.A. 314 B.R. 486 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (court recognizing and enforcing Argentine restructuring plan and dismissing 
involuntary chapter 11 case). 
179 See Walters, Giving Effect to Foreign Restructuring Plans, supra note 143. 
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unacceptable in domestic chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. 180  Foreign plans 
emanating from sister common law jurisdictions, notably Canada and the UK, have 
received particularly favorable treatment. These include plans that modify or discharge 
New York law governed obligations.181 Viewed from the other side of the Atlantic, US 
practice in all these instances exemplifies American exceptionalism.182 No other Model 
Law country, apart perhaps from Canada, 183  has taken such a comity-driven, proto-
universalist approach. 
US courts do not unhesitatingly apply foreign insolvency law in chapter 15 cases. 
Indeed, it is important to point out that chapter 15 petitions are frequently uncontested 
and so result in what might be described as functionally universalist applications of the 
Model Law. But even in contested cases where US courts have declined to apply foreign 
law, they have used tempering concepts within the statute itself – such as the requirement 
that the court may grant discretionary relief only if the interests of creditors and other 
entities are sufficiently protected – to frame their decision.  This is evident from the 
decisions in two well-known and controversial cases, Qimonda184 and Vitro.185  
In Qimonda the Fourth Circuit prevented a German foreign representative from 
unilaterally terminating the debtor’s licenses of its US patents, a course open to him 
                                                        
180 See In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments, 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re 
Sino-Forest Corporation, 501 B.R. 655, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Avanti Communications Group Plc, 
582 B.R. 603, 605 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
181 Under current UK law, a US plan purporting to discharge English law governed obligations, by contrast, 
would not be given effect in the UK. A parallel proceeding and UK plan would be necessary to achieve the 
objective of a binding discharge in both countries. See Walters, Giving Effect to Foreign Restructuring 
Plans, supra note 143. The UK is not alone. This is the position in some Asian jurisdictions. See Min Han, 
Recognition of Insolvency Effects of a Foreign Insolvency Proceeding: Focusing on the Effect of Discharge 
in MURUGA P. RAMASWAMY & JOÃO RIBEIRO, TRADE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH 
HARMONIZATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 345 (2015).  
182 Gerard McCormack, US Exceptionalism and UK Localism? Cross-Border Insolvency in Comparative 
Perspective, 36 LEGAL STUDIES 136, 152-154, 160 (2016). 
183 See Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, supra note 10, 745. 
184 Jaffé v. Samsung Electronics Company, Limited, 737 F.3d 14 (4th Cir. 2013). 
185 In re Vitro S.A.B. de CV, 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 57 
under German insolvency law. Holding that the sufficient protection standard in section 
1522(a) required a balancing of the competing substantive interests of the debtor (in 
maximizing the value of its patent portfolio) and US patent licensees (in protecting 
investments made in reliance on cross-license agreements that would have been protected 
in a domestic bankruptcy case by section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code), the court 
concluded that the adverse implications for the licensees outweighed the benefit of the 
requested relief to the debtor.  
In Vitro the Fifth Circuit declined to give effect to a Mexican concurso plan in the 
peculiar circumstances of that case, concluding that section 1507(b)(4) precluded the 
granting of such relief because the treatment of noteholder claims in the plan was 
drastically inferior to the treatment they would have received under a comparable chapter 
11 plan. Vitro is best regarded as an exceptional case that turns on its own peculiar 
facts.186 The court’s statements of general principle do nothing to detract from the view, 
expressed above, that US courts routinely give US effect to foreign plans even where the 
relief requested by the foreign representative is not identical to (more generous than) the 
relief available in a comparable domestic bankruptcy proceeding.187 And although the 
foreign representative lost in both cases, Qimonda and Vitro do not significantly deviate 
                                                        
186 Acceptance of the Mexican plan depended on the votes of Vitro non-debtor subsidiaries that held inter-
company debt. As a result of an earlier restructuring, the subsidiaries had been transformed from inter-
company debtors into inter-company creditors. The circumstances of the earlier restructuring were opaque 
to say the least. The plan eliminated guarantees from non-debtor insiders whose votes were critical to plan 
acceptance. See id., 1038-42, 1052-53. 
187 See id., 1043-45, 1053-54 (“Central to Chapter 15 is comity…Within the context of Chapter 
15…[comity] is raised to a principal objective…In considering whether to grant relief, it is not necessary 
that the result achieved in the foreign bankruptcy proceeding be identical to that which would be had in the 
United States. It is sufficient if the result is ‘comparable’…Given Chapter 15’s heavy emphasis on comity, 
it is not necessary…that the relief requested…be identical to, or available under, United States law…”) 
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from the prevailing American view that comity is the animating norm of chapter 15 and 
that limitations on comity must be drawn from within the statute.188  
As chapter 15 is an addition to the pre-existing Bankruptcy Code instances have 
arisen where the text of the Code is in tension with the Model Law’s stated goals. In these 
instances involving apparent conflicts of text and purpose, some judges have adopted 
textualist readings that evidence a more skeptical tendency in US judicial practice as 
regards reception of the Model Law189 – especially among appeals courts that are one or 
more steps removed from the frontline bankruptcy courts and more generalist than 
specialist in terms of their expertise.  
In In re Barnet,190 the Second Circuit ruled that section 109 of the Bankruptcy 
Code – which determines whether a debtor is eligible to file a case under the various 
chapters of the Code – also applies to cases filed under chapter 15. Section 109(a) 
provides that “only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or 
property in the United States may be a debtor under this title.” Adopting a plain meaning 
approach to statutory interpretation, the Second Circuit reasoned that chapter 1 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which includes section 109(a), applies to chapter 15 and that “foreign 
proceedings” involve the “assets and affairs of a debtor.” Accordingly, the court 
concluded that a foreign proceeding can only be recognized under chapter 15 if the debtor 
in that proceeding is also eligible to be a debtor under the Code as a whole – by meeting 
                                                        
188 See id., 1054 (“Nevertheless, Chapter 15 does impose certain requirements and considerations that act as 
a brake or limitation on comity, and preclude granting the relief requested…”). The Qimonda decision is 
less emphatic about comity but acknowledges the statutory reference to it in §1509 as well as the tempering 
mechanisms built into the statutory framework: Jaffé v. Samsung Electronics Company, Limited, 737 F.3d 
14, 24 (4th Cir. 2013). Of the two decisions, US commentators tend to regard Qimonda as the one that is 
less easy to justify. See, e.g. Gropper, Curious Disappearance, supra note 74, 172-75; G. Ray Warner, 
Cross-Border Cooperation in the United States: A Retreat or Merely a Pause?, , 3 NOTT. INSOLV. & BUS. 
L. e-J. 393, Dawson, Local Methods, supra note 74, 69-72. 
189 See, generally, Dawson, Local Methods, supra note 74. 
190 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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the section 109(a) debtor eligibility requirements. Section 109(a) is a low bar to debtor 
eligibility for domestic bankruptcy proceedings.191 The mere presence of debtor property 
in the United States will usually suffice. As such, it is straightforward for forum shopping 
foreign debtors to engineer a full chapter 11 filing. In many chapter 15 cases the 
additional requirement of debtor eligibility will easily be met because the purpose of the 
application for recognition will be to deal with the debtor’s US assets. But in Barnet, the 
debtor had no assets in the United States – or none that the Australian foreign 
representatives knew of. Their purpose in filing the chapter 15 case was to seek discovery 
against various entities relating to a lawsuit the foreign representatives had commenced in 
Australia. US courts can grant such relief “upon recognition” in their discretion under 
section 1521(a)(4).192 
Critics of Barnet fairly point out that section 109 is concerned with debtor 
eligibility whereas the sole actor for the purposes of a chapter 15 case is the foreign 
representative. The Delaware Bankruptcy Court has declined to follow the Second 
Circuit on precisely this basis setting up a potential circuit split.193 However, prudent 
practitioners in other circuits have to factor the risk that Barnet may be followed in 
preparing chapter 15 filings. Thus, the resolution of a “text versus purpose” conflict in 
favor of text in Barnet has added a gloss to the Model Law’s recognition framework that 
                                                        
191 See Adrian Walters, “United States’ Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Over Foreign Entities: Exorbitant or 
Congruent”, 17 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES 367 (2017), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14735970.2017.1299841  
192 In re Barnet, 737 F.3d 238, 246 (2d Cir. 2013). 
193 In re Bemarmara Consulting A.S., Case No. 13-13037 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 17, 2013). A District 
Court in the Ninth Circuit sided with the Second Circuit: In re Forge Group Power Pty Ltd., Case No. 17-
2405 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 12, 2018). However, a bankruptcy court in the Eleventh Circuit declined to follow 
Barnet and its decision survived an appeal to the District Court: Batista v. Mendes, Case No. 17-24308 
(S.D. Fla, April 2, 2018). 
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requires foreign representatives to demonstrate and, if necessary, engineer compliance 
with domestic rules.194  
 In similar vein, some courts have read the automatic application upon recognition 
of section 363 to transfers of debtor property within US territorial jurisdiction 195  as 
requiring them to conduct a full sales approval process under US law rather than granting 
comity to a prior approval order of the foreign court.196 Commentators have detected in 
these and other instances a tendency to privilege local interpretive methodologies over 
more flexible interpretive methodologies that may better reflect the Model Law’s 
international origins and purpose.197 Be that as it may, US chapter 15 jurisprudence, as a 
whole, reveals considerable commitment to a strong version of modified universalism 
that is presumptively deferential to foreign law.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
194 For discussion and criticism see letter dated January 27, 2016 from the National Bankruptcy Conference 
to Congress available at http://nbconf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/NBC-Ltr-to-Cong-re-Ch-15-
Amendments2.pdf (asking Congress to disapply §109 in chapter 15 cases). See further Daniel Glosband & 
Jay L. Westbrook, Chapter 15 Recognition in the United States: Is a Debtor “Presence” Required?, 24 
INT. INSOLV. REV. 28 (2015); Dawson, Local Methods, supra note 74, 72-74; Adrian Walters, 
Recognition of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings in the United States: the Lingering Barnet Problem, 38 
COMPANY LAWYER 201 (2017). 
195 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(2). 
196 In re Elpida Memory, Inc., 2012 WL 6090194 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 20, 2012) (“The result here under a 
plain meaning analysis is straightforward. Section 1520(a) unequivocally states that ‘sections 363, 549, and 
552 apply to a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States to the same extent that the sections would apply to property of an estate (emphasis added). 
The emphasized language clearly provides that section 363 and, by implication, its standards are applicable 
to the transfer of assets located in the United States by a foreign debtor in a foreign main proceeding 
outside the ordinary course of business.”); Krys v. Farnum Place, LLC (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 768 
F.3d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The language of section 1520(a)(2) is plain; the bankruptcy court is 
required to conduct a section 363 review when the debtor seeks a transfer of an interest in property within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States… The language of the statute makes it plain that the 
bankruptcy court was required to conduct a section 363 review. Deference to the BVI Court was not 
required.”). 
197 Dawson, Local Methods, supra note 74. Dawson astutely points out (at 79) that courts that defect from 
the Model Law’s language and purpose are not necessarily motivated by territorialist instincts to protect 
local interests. Sometimes local law (or, for Dawson, local interpretive method) overrides. 
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2. “Glocal” judging in the UK  
 
Outward looking judges could conceivably fashion the exercise of discretionary 
powers under the CBIR along American modified universalist lines, taking cues from 
experience under the EU Insolvency Regulation, section 426, and the specific 
adjustments that the CBIR makes to the common law. But that is not what has happened 
in practice.  
It is beyond question that the CBIR explicitly depart from the common law in 
important ways. They establish rules of recognition based on COMI and establishment 
that align “third country” cross-border insolvency law with EU law and move away from 
the common law’s insistence that the country of incorporation is the proper venue for 
winding up proceedings. One consequence is that UK courts will recognize foreign 
insolvency proceedings relating to UK-incorporated debtors without the necessity for a 
parallel UK proceeding.198 The CBIR also abrogate the rule in Government of India v. 
Taylor199 (which bars recovery of foreign tax claims in UK insolvency proceedings) and 
trigger automatic consequences in English law that affect procedural rights under English 
law governed contracts.200   
But these departures – and proclaimed judicial allegiance to modified 
universalism – have not led judges to give effect to foreign insolvency law when 
exercising their discretionary powers.201 Instead, judges have used modified universalism 
                                                        
198 In re 19 Entertainment Limited, [2016] EWHC 1545 (Ch). 
199 [1955] A.C. 491. See CBIR, art. 13(3). 
200 Samsun Logix Corporation v. DEF, [2009] EWHC 576 (Ch), [2009] B.P.I.R. 1502. 
201 This is illustrated by Pan Ocean discussed in the text infra at III.C.2.c. But Pan Ocean is not an outlier. 
Consistent with GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 4, para. 21(b), UK courts craft relief to foreign 
representatives under discretionary powers in CBIR, art. 21 by reference to the relief available in a 
comparable UK proceeding. See In re Atlas Bulk Shipping A/S [2011] EWHC 878 (Ch), [2012] Bus. L.R. 
1124 (treating the relief available to the foreign representative under art.21 as including that which would 
be available to a UK office holder in respect of UK insolvency proceedings commenced on the date of 
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as rhetorical cover to rationalize the grant of judicial assistance to foreign representatives 
under, and subject to the limits of, UK law. The utility of this approach should not be 
underestimated. It permits the court to assist foreign representatives to the extent it would 
ordinarily assist an English liquidator or administrator without the need for a parallel 
English insolvency proceeding and even in circumstances where the debtor would not 
strictly be eligible to commence a parallel local proceeding. However, it is a weaker 
version of modified universalism that does not match the loftier ambitions of universalists 
because it falls well short of a single, all-encompassing global insolvency proceeding 
under one law.202 Three examples from the case law will suffice to illustrate how the 
complex, fragmented structure of UK cross-border insolvency law has contributed to a 
cautious approach to the exercise of judicial discretion under the CBIR reinforcing 
existing fault lines between UK and US practice. 
 
a. HIH 
 
Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd203 was decided before the CBIR 
came into force. Nevertheless, it is important because it illustrates the prevailing 
restrictive UK judicial mindset notwithstanding Lord Hoffmann’s creative attempt to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
commencement of the foreign proceeding); In re 19 Entertainment Limited, [2016] EWHC 1545 (Ch), 
[11]-[12] (“[T]he effect of the Model Law is to give to the English court the possibility of enabling the 
position of a company which is in Chapter 11…in the United States, to be put on a similar footing in 
England…the scheme laid down by [the CBIR] is not to import American law into England, but rather to 
enable proceedings to be conducted in relation to insolvency matters in England on a footing comparable to 
the footing under which the matter would be dealt with…in the United States.”). Thus, it is standard 
practice for UK courts to use their powers in CBIR, art.21 to extend the automatic stay provided for in 
CBIR, art. 20 so as to make the stay in the UK equivalent in scope to the moratorium that takes effect in a 
UK administration proceeding: id., [20]-[22]. See also In re Peak Hotels and Resorts Limited, [2017] 
EWHC 1511 (Ch) (liquidators of BVI debtor entitled in principle to relief under UK statutory lien 
avoidance powers). 
202 So much so that universalists can justifiably claim that UK judges are mischaracterizing. I concede that 
“modified territorialism” could well be a more appropriate characterization. But this does not detract from 
my basic point that what UK judges call “modified universalism” is not understood in quite the same way 
in the UK as it is understood in much of American legal discourse. 
203 [2008] 1 WLR 852 (UKHL). 
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develop an expansive common law principle of modified universalism. HIH concerned an 
Australian insurance and reinsurance group that was in liquidation in its country of 
incorporation. HIH group companies were also in parallel provisional liquidation 
proceedings in England and Wales. At the instigation of the Australian liquidators, the 
Australian court asked the English court to direct the provisional liquidators to remit 
assets gathered in the English proceeding for distribution in the Australian liquidation. 
The issue in HIH arose because of a conflict of priority rules. If reinsurance recoveries in 
the UK were distributed according to Australian rules, insurance creditors would get a 
priority they would not enjoy were the English provisional liquidators to distribute the 
assets in accordance with English law. Creditors who would be better off under English 
law would be worse off under Australian law and vice versa. The case raised a 
fundamental question – when acting in ancillary fashion in aid of a foreign main 
insolvency proceeding does the English court have the power to disapply English 
statutory distributional rules and, if so, on what basis?  
In a speech rightly hailed by universalists as a landmark, Lord Hoffmann opined 
that the English court had inherent jurisdiction at common law to direct the provisional 
liquidators to remit assets and, having regard to “the principle of (modified) universalism, 
which has been the golden thread running through English cross-border insolvency law 
since the 18th century”, that “English courts should, so far as is consistent with justice and 
UK public policy co-operate with the courts in the country of the principal liquidation to 
ensure that all the company’s assets are distributed to its creditors under a single system 
of distribution.”204 But, while the House of Lords as a whole agreed with Lord Hoffmann 
in the result and directed remittal of the English assets to Australia for distribution under 
                                                        
204 Id., [30]. 
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Australian priority rules, only one other judge supported his reasoning.  Two judges held 
that the legal basis for remittal lay in section 426 of the Insolvency Act rather than the 
common law and a third expressed no view on the common law position. The HIH 
decision, then, rests ultimately on a statutory not a common law footing: the English 
court could, in its discretion, safely remit the assets for distribution in a designated 
country otherwise than in accordance with the English statutory scheme precisely 
because the statutory scheme (via section 426) so authorized.205 
HIH illustrates a tendency among UK judges to seek a specific statutory basis in 
English law for the relief sought by a foreign representative or court and a corresponding 
unwillingness (contrary to Lord Hoffmann’s inclination) to fashion a broad unenumerated 
discretionary common law power of judicial assistance animated by modified 
universalism.206 Article 21 of the CBIR provides a statutory basis for the English court to 
                                                        
205 Id., [59], [61]-[62] (Lord Scott), [66], [75]-[77], [82] (Lord Neuberger). See also Andrew Godwin et al, 
The Inherent Power of Common Law Courts to Provide Assistance in Cross-Border Insolvencies: From 
Comity to Complexity, 26 INT’L. INSOLV. REV. 5, 19-20 (2017). 
206 In the absence of a statutory basis for relief, UK judges have also been loathe to develop the common 
law of judicial assistance expansively, preferring instead to fashion specific common law powers 
incrementally by analogy with existing powers. See e.g. Singularis Holdings Limited v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] A.C. 1675. This, I believe, is significant. The Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council (which decided Singularis) remains the ultimate arbiter of cases from 
many of the British offshore jurisdictions. Cross-border insolvency law in these jurisdictions is 
underdeveloped and rests heavily on the common law: see Ian Kawaley, “Relashio”: Liberating the 
Common Law on Judicial Cooperation from its State of Arrested Development – The British Atlantic and 
Caribbean World, 3 NOTT. INSOLV. & BUS. L. e-J. 167; Andrew Godwin et al, The Inherent Power of 
Common Law Courts to Provide Assistance in Cross-Border Insolvencies: From Comity to Complexity, 26 
INT’L. INSOLV. REV. 5, 13-14 (2017). My working hypothesis is that UK courts would prefer to see these 
jurisdictions develop statutory frameworks rather than create an expansive offshore common law that 
would be at odds with the residual status of the common law in the UK. There is a prevailing unease about 
the co-existence of an expansive common law that implicates a generous measure of judicial discretion 
alongside statutory bases of relief even among some creatively inclined offshore judges. See, e.g. In re 
Saad Investments [2013] SC (Bda) (Bermuda) per Kawaley CJ at [6]: “This is an area of law that in recent 
times has often been dominated by commercial pragmatism combined with an almost deification of the 
goal of promoting cross-border co-operation in insolvency cases with an international element, unwittingly 
no doubt, at the expense of the development of a set of coherent principles.”; In re China Agrotech 
Holdings Limited, FSD 157 of 2017 (NSJ) per Segal J at [26(b)]: “I would, for myself, note that there 
appears to be an unhelpful tendency in the writings of some commentators to mischaracterise the status and 
effect of this guiding and flexible principle [of modified universalism] by elevating it into a rigid rule of 
law that independently generates rights and remedies and is to be treated, and applied, as if it were a 
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turn over assets to a foreign main or non-main proceeding207 and so it is conceivable that 
English practice in response to requests for remission of assets from foreign 
representatives in section 426 countries and third countries will become unified. But, 
Lord Hoffmann’s attempt to modernize the common law notwithstanding, the overall 
message of HIH is that well developed statutory forms of judicial assistance tend to curb 
the scope for expansive common law development.  
 
b. Rubin 
 
In Rubin v Eurofinance SA; New Cap Insurance Corpn Ltd v Grant208  a 4-1 
majority of the UK Supreme Court209 declined to recognize and enforce default money 
judgments entered by a US insolvency court in proceedings brought in a Chapter 11 case 
under statutory insolvency avoiding powers against defendants who were not present in 
the United States and had not submitted to the US insolvency court’s jurisdiction. Rubin 
was a turf war about the scope of UK cross-border insolvency law as a whole. The Rubin 
court’s holding stakes out the boundaries of the English law of judicial assistance in 
international insolvencies (cross-border insolvency law) and resists its encroachment on 
the common law private international law rules relating to recognition and enforcement 
of judgments. Rubin’s main implication is that, absent specific statutory provision, there 
is no independent basis in cross-border insolvency law for enforcing judgments entered 
                                                                                                                                                                     
doctrine in metaphysics or theology.” See also Lord Neuberger, The Supreme Court, the Privy Council and 
International Insolvency, text of a keynote speech at the International Insolvency Institute Annual 
Conference, London, June 19, 2017: https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170619.pdf (providing 
insights into the mindset of senior UK judges consistent with my analysis here). 
207 See e.g. In re SwissAir Schweizerische Luftverkehr-Aktiengesellschaft [2009] EWHC 2099 (Ch), 
[2010] B.C.C. 667 (though in this case a distribution under either Swiss or English law would have 
produced the same outcome for creditors). 
208 [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 A.C. 236.   
209 The Supreme Court was established pursuant to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (c.4), and replaced 
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords as the UK’s highest court in 2009.  
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during the course of foreign insolvency proceedings. By “judgments entered during the 
course of foreign insolvency proceedings” I do not mean judgments or orders that 
commence an insolvency proceeding. The actual insolvency proceeding is squarely the 
province of cross-border insolvency law. Instead, I mean what international insolvency 
lawyers now describe as “insolvency-related judgments”, i.e. additional judgments and 
orders made within the insolvency case – proceedings within insolvency proceedings. 
Two examples of insolvency-related judgments are judgments avoiding antecedent 
transactions on grounds such as fraudulent transfer (the subject matter of Rubin) and 
orders confirming a reorganization plan and binding all creditors to the terms of a plan, 
whether they voted in favor of it or not. 
The Rubin court ruled that insolvency-related judgments were no different from 
other civil judgments and therefore could only be recognized under the ordinary English 
rules for recognition and enforcement of judgments.210 The court rejected the argument 
that the English court should treat insolvency-related judgments as a special category and 
give effect to them under Lord Hoffmann’s theory of modified universalism.211 Writing 
for the majority, Lord Collins opined that it would be an act of judicial legislation for the 
courts to create a separate, more liberal regime for recognition and enforcement of 
insolvency-related judgments within cross-border insolvency law 212  observing, in 
passing, that universalism, characterized as the administration of multinational 
                                                        
210 Id., [106]-[132]. 
211 An argument that was open to the foreign representative based on the Privy Council’s decision in 
Cambridge Gas Transport Corp v. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings 
plc, [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 508. 
212 [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 A.C. 236, [129]. 
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insolvencies by a lead court applying a single insolvency law, was “a trend, but only a 
trend.”213  
Furthermore, the court found no statutory basis in the CBIR or in section 426 for 
recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments. The court’s general 
discretion to grant relief available to a British insolvency office-holder under UK law and 
to cooperate with foreign courts and representatives 214  was not a source of implied 
authority for the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments. 215 
Similarly, general powers of assistance in section 426 could not impliedly cover the 
ground occupied by long-established common law and statutory rules applicable to 
recognition and enforcement of ordinary civil judgments.216 
Rubin amplifies the structural differences between US and UK cross-border 
insolvency law and provides a silent commentary on the lack of any judgments 
convention between the UK and the US. EU law, for the time being still applicable in the 
UK, has specific supranational rules on recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters 217  and makes specific provision in the EU Insolvency 
Regulation for recognition and enforcement throughout the EU of insolvency-related 
                                                        
213 Id., [16]. 
214 CBIR, arts 21, 25, 27. The British enactment substitutes “may” for “shall” in art.25(1). Cooperation with 
foreign courts or foreign representatives thereunder is therefore a matter of discretion rather than 
obligation. Moreover, the British enactment provides that cooperation could be achieved through a British 
insolvency officeholder and so contemplates the possibility of a complementary parallel proceeding. 
215 [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 A.C. 236, [133]-[144]. 
216 Id., [145]-[155]. Section 426 did not apply in Rubin because the US is not a designated country. 
However, its scope was relevant to an appeal by an Australian liquidator in the New Cap Insurance case on 
an identical question, which was conjoined with the appeal in Rubin.  
217 Regulation (EU) No.1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), 2012 
O.J. (L. 351/1). The UK also has reciprocal regimes for the recognition and enforcement of judgments with 
several jurisdictions with which it has historical or constitutional relationships. These are embodied in the 
Administration of Justice Act 1920 (10 & 11 Geo.5 c.81) and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Act 1933 (23 & 24 Geo.5 c.13). 
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judgments. 218  The absence of enumerated powers for the recognition of insolvency-
related judgments in the UK’s cross-border insolvency framework for non-EU countries 
was therefore fatal to the foreign representative’s attempt to have the US judgment 
recognized under cross-border insolvency law.219 Rubin consolidates the trend observable 
in HIH that UK courts are reluctant to grant assistance unless there is a specific UK law 
basis for the particular relief the foreign representative seeks. It also underscores the UK 
courts’ disinclination to fashion specific relief using broadly couched statutory powers of 
assistance and cooperation.220  
One consequence of Rubin is an Anglo-US fault line in the treatment of foreign 
reorganization plans and foreign discharges of debt. US courts have commonly 
recognized and given effect in the US to foreign plans and discharges in the form of relief 
and/or additional assistance under chapter 15.221 Under the Rubin holding, UK courts can 
only give effect to foreign plans and discharges in non-EU insolvency proceedings if they 
satisfy applicable English private international law rules on the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments. In a case where UK-based holdout creditors have not 
                                                        
218 EU INSOLVENCY REGULATION, art. 32. 
219 [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 A.C. 236, [24], [142]-[143]. Under the applicable common law rules of 
personal jurisdiction, the US court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgments against parties who were not 
present and had not submitted to US jurisdiction at that time: id., [6]-[10]. This has led courts to broaden 
what qualifies as “submission” to the foreign jurisdiction under these rules. Id., [156]-[167].  See Stichting 
Shell Pensioenfonds v. Krys, [2014] UKPC 41, [2015] A.C. 2016; Erste Group Bank AG, London Branch 
v. JSC ‘VMZ Red October’, [2015] EWCA Civ 379, [2015] 1 C.L.C. 706; Vizcaya Partners Ltd v. Picard, 
[2016] UKPC 5, [2016] Bus. L.R. 413. For the argument that the UK should simply grant comity to the 
US’s broader rules of personal jurisdiction where due process has been followed in accordance with US 
constitutional standards see Jodie Kirshner, The (False) Conflict Between Due Process Rights and 
Universalism in Cross-Border Insolvency, 72 CAMB. L.J. 27, 30-31 (2013). 
220 Other Model Law countries are encountering similar uncertainties on the fault line between cross-border 
insolvency law and the law relating to the recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments: 
see e.g. Justice Nye Perram, Issues in Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Insolvency Judgments – An 
Australian Perspective, paper for the Judicial Insolvency Network Conference, Singapore, October 10-11, 
2016, http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/digital-law-library/judges-speeches/justice-perram/perram-j-20161010  
221 Walters, Giving Effect to Foreign Restructuring Plans, supra note 143. The English rule that contract 
debts can only be discharged under the governing law of the contract puts a further obstacle in the way of 
UK judges who might otherwise be minded to give effect to foreign discharges in the UK. See In re OJSC 
International Bank of Azerbaijan [2018] EWHC 792 (Ch) (appeal pending at the time of writing). 
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submitted to the foreign jurisdiction, the workaround is a parallel English insolvency 
proceeding yielding a binding plan and discharge that would be effective in English 
law222 – the kind of duplication that universalists are anxious to avoid.  UNICTRAL has 
proposed a draft Model Law223 to deal specifically with insolvency-related judgments 
that could potentially address the gap in domestic legal provision for judgments not 
covered by a treaty-based regime such as EU law. 
 
c. Pan Ocean 
 
In Fibria Celulose S/A v. Pan Ocean Co Ltd,224 a Korean-incorporated shipowner 
in a Korean rehabilitation proceeding had entered a long-term contract expressly 
governed by English law to charter ships to carry cargo for a Brazilian wood pulp 
supplier. The shipowner wanted the contract to continue because the freight payable 
under it was above market rates. The supplier sought to rely on a clause permitting it to 
terminate the contract in the event of insolvency or the taking of steps in an insolvency 
proceeding. It was common ground in Pan Ocean that the termination clause was valid as 
a matter of English law even though other jurisdictions, including the US, outlaw such 
so-called ipso facto clauses because of concerns that they harm legitimate attempts by 
debtors to reorganize. 225 The Korean administrator obtained recognition of the 
rehabilitation proceeding and asked the English court for relief in the form of an order 
                                                        
222 Walters, Giving Effect to Foreign Restructuring Plans, supra note 143. 
223 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Recognition and 
enforcement of insolvency-related judgments: draft model law (Note by the Secretariat for the fifty-second 
session, December 18-22, 2017), U.N. Doc A/AC.9/WG.V/WP.150. 
224 [2014] EWHC 2124 (Ch), [2014] Bus LR 1041. 
225 English law tends to be more protective of contractual rights especially in the context of sophisticated 
commercial transactions. See e.g. Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services 
Ltd, [2011] UKSC 38, [2012] 1 A.C. 383. 
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restraining the supplier from terminating the contract on the ground that the clause was 
unenforceable under Korean insolvency law. 
For universalists the case is a lightning rod. In their estimation, the UK court 
should have deferred to the law applicable in the Korean proceeding. However, Morgan 
J. held that the words “any appropriate relief” in the opening language of Article 21(1) of 
the CBIR, while wide, did not permit the court to grant relief that would not have been 
available in an English insolvency proceeding. The absence of any express statutory basis 
for applying foreign law was again fatal as the following passage from the judgment 
illustrates: 
A power for the recognising court to grant relief in that way would be a very significant power. It 
is odd to think that such a power was intended without there being any specific reference to the 
recognising court’s ability to apply the law of a foreign state, or even to do something which no 
system anywhere would allow. This is particularly so in view of the terms of sub-paragraph (g) [of 
Article 21(1)] which deliberately limit relief under that sub-paragraph to relief which would be 
available to a British insolvency office holder under the law of Great Britain.226 
  
 
d. Summary 
 
The three cases show powerfully how fidelity to pre-existing local law has shaped 
the UK’s reception of the Model Law. Elsewhere in UK law lines between cross-border 
insolvency law and judgments recognition and enforcement are clearly drawn. Powers 
couched in open-ended language supported by enumerated examples (the linguistic 
structure of Article 21(1)) have not redrawn those lines. The EU Insolvency Regulation 
and section 426 expressly contemplate the application of the law of the foreign 
proceeding. This prompts the conclusion that the lack of any express power in the CBIR 
to apply foreign law is preclusive.  
                                                        
226 [2014] EWHC 2124 (Ch), [2014] Bus LR 1041, [80]. It is true that, by virtue of CBIR, art.2(q), “the law 
of Great Britain” expressly includes domestic private international law. But the point goes nowhere useful 
for universalists because the UK’s Insolvency Act does not provide a UK officeholder appointed 
thereunder with a basis for seeking relief under any law other than UK law.  
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The UK approach to the Model Law is at odds with the US approach in this 
regard. The Pan Ocean court’s reading of Article 21 defaults to the traditional common 
law approach under the doctrine of ancillary winding up in the absence of any express 
statutory choice-of-law rule whereas US courts have read the equivalent language in 
section 1521 of the Bankruptcy Code as permitting them to grant relief under foreign law 
as well as US law in the absence of a statutory prohibition.227 
In recent years, much of the jurisprudential debate in the UK has concerned the 
scope of common law powers and the extent to which UK courts can grant relief by 
analogy with relief that would be available to an officeholder in a parallel UK 
proceeding, but without the costs of such a proceeding actually having to be incurred.  In 
its landmark decision in Cambridge Gas Transport Corp v The Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings plc, the Privy Council, speaking through 
Lord Hoffmann, held that the Manx court could give effect in the Isle of Man to a chapter 
11 plan relating to a Manx entity under its common law powers of assistance on the basis 
that the exact same result could have been achieved under Manx law by means of a 
winding up and a scheme of arrangement under the Isle of Man Companies Act.228 
Cambridge Gas proved controversial in the UK because, as well as contemplating an 
independent basis for recognition of insolvency-related judgments going beyond the 
common law rules for recognition and enforcement of civil judgments generally (an 
approach later rejected in Rubin as a judicial overreach), it also implied that courts could 
                                                        
227 See, e.g. In re Condor Ins. Ltd., 601 F.3d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 2010). In similar vein, US courts place far 
less emphasis on non-bankruptcy choice of law. There is a tradition, already noted, of granting comity to 
foreign insolvency law even where it overrides contract rights governed by US state law. This is perhaps 
borne out of the US conception of bankruptcy jurisdiction as all encompassing federal in rem subject matter 
jurisdiction. For a rare, and probably anomalous, exception see In re SunEdison, Inc. 577 B.R. 120 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
228 [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 508, [24]. 
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use common law powers synthetically to procure results that would usually require full 
compliance with UK statutory procedures. Lord Hoffmann’s rationale for broad inherent 
powers was the “underlying principle of universality” and the desirability of avoiding the 
costs of additional Manx proceedings. 229  “Why”, Lord Hoffmann asked, “should the 
Manx court not provide assistance by giving effect to the plan without requiring creditors 
to go to the trouble of parallel proceedings in the Isle of Man?” 230  A differently 
constituted Privy Council in Singularis Holdings Limited v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
provided an answer. While endorsing modified universalism as a basis for incremental 
development of common law powers, the Singularis court rejected as constitutionally 
improper Lord Hoffmann’s conception of a broad judicial power to disapply UK statutory 
requirements. 231  
Singularis aside, even on Lord Hoffmann’s broad view in Cambridge Gas, British 
modified universalism amounts, at its highest, to a principle for avoiding parallel 
insolvency proceedings by giving the foreign representative “the remedies to which they 
would have been entitled if the equivalent proceedings had taken place in the domestic 
forum.”232 Indeed, the Cambridge Gas court doubted whether common law assistance 
“could take the form of applying provisions of the foreign insolvency law which form no 
part of the domestic system.”233 And, to date, while the CBIR does authorize UK judges 
in some respects to apply UK law synthetically without the need for a parallel UK 
proceeding, British modified universalism, as we have seen, has not embraced the 
                                                        
229 Id., [16], [20]. 
230 Id., [25]. 
231 [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] A.C. 1675, [16]-[17], [19], [32], [35]-[36], [38], [64], [82]-[102], [108], [112], 
[122], [134]. 
232 [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 508, [22]. 
233 Id. 
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application of foreign insolvency law. It is more restrained than its American cousin: a 
coordinating rather than a centralizing principle. As Lord Sumption put it in Singularis, 
“..the principle of modified universalism is part of the common law, but it is necessary to 
bear in mind, first, that it is subject to local law and local public policy and, secondly, 
that the court can only ever act within the limits of its own statutory and common law 
powers.”234 Current judicial instincts in the UK are therefore cautious and incremental. 
UK judges look first for a statutory basis for the specific relief sought and, failing that, 
they are willing to develop the common law only interstitially rather than create 
expansive, general powers. 235  Judges, such as the immediate past President of the 
Supreme Court, have highlighted the difference in view between the US and UK 
approach 236  and regard any such inconsistency as a spur to further international 
legislative action rather than to creative, ends-oriented judicial activism.237 
 
D. The limits of modified universalism as an interpretive methodology. 
 
Professor Westbrook argues238 that the Model Law is a text that seeks to establish 
an international system for managing cross-border insolvencies predicated on 
universalism and that judges should interpret it accordingly. He is right in his assessment 
                                                        
234 [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] A.C. 1675, [19]. 
235 [2006] UKPC 26, [2007] 1 A.C. 508, [25], [38], [65]-[69], [113], [115], [135], [137], [147], [151]-[155], 
[157]-[161]. See also Ian Kawaley, “Relashio”: Liberating the Common Law on Judicial Cooperation from 
its State of Arrested Development – The British Atlantic and Caribbean World, 3 NOTT. INSOLV. & BUS. 
L. e-J. 167, 209 (“Granting common law insolvency assistance by deploying well-defined remedial powers 
available under the general law is obviously a far more straightforward task than developing or extending 
an ancient inherent power in aid of a loosely defined principle of ‘providing as much assistance as one 
can.’”) 
236 Lord Neuberger, The Supreme Court, the Privy Council and International Insolvency, text of a keynote 
speech at the International Insolvency Institute Annual Conference, London, June 19, 2017: 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170619.pdf  , [26] (“The extent to which the Model Law 
promotes substantive universalism (i.e. the application of the law governing the foreign insolvency 
proceeding) appears to be answered differently in different jurisdictions. Thus, the US courts seem to have 
adopted a rather more universalist approach than the courts of the UK.”). 
237 Id. 
238 Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, supra note 10. 
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that the structure of the Model Law is such that “one would expect to see considerable 
success in achieving recognition and a more mixed bag as to relief granted.”239 This 
assessment is borne out by the empirical evidence discussed earlier. And while I agree 
with him that the UK cases discussed above present a contrast with North American 
experience, I think it is an exaggeration to say that UK judicial attitudes “now hover 
between hostility and indifference to the Model Law and perhaps to internationalism in 
general.”240 My point is not that UK judges are necessarily right in some objective sense. 
It is entirely defensible to view their current statutory-mindedness as stifling any 
meaningful development of UK cross-border insolvency law, especially insofar as it 
relates to third countries.241 My point is rather that the decisions in HIH, Rubin, and Pan 
Ocean are perfectly plausible once we pay attention to the Model Law’s place in the 
fragmentary set up of UK cross-border insolvency law in the absence of further local 
legislative amendment. For this reason, while I dislike the outcome in Rubin, and the tone 
of the leading opinion,242 I would concede that it is correctly decided (or not clearly 
erroneous) in a situated sense from a UK lawyer’s perspective. Any suggestion that Rubin 
is an abandonment of modified universalism is overblown. It reflects – as subsequent 
decisions have borne out – a less potent version of modified universalism encompassing a 
                                                        
239 Id., 743. 
240 Id., 746. Cf. Lord Neuberger, The Supreme Court, the Privy Council and International Insolvency, text 
of a keynote speech at the International Insolvency Institute Annual Conference, London, June 19, 2017: 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170619.pdf 
241 There are reasonable arguments that statutory innovations like the Model Law should be a spur to 
creative yet judicious development of the common law and purpose-oriented exercise of statutory 
discretion. The doctrine of ancillary winding up, for example, is a common law artifact of pre-1986 UK 
insolvency law developed at a time when the insolvency law of much of the common law world, under the 
influence of the British Empire, to all intents and purposes was English law. The doctrine is wholly out of 
step with the late-twentieth century global embrace of rescue and restructuring regimes as a value-
enhancing alternative to liquidation. Thus, on one view, the judges could use statutory cues to update 
ancient common law doctrines of cross-border insolvency but it is not a view that commanded any support 
from the Privy Council in Singularis. See [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] A.C. 1675, [73]-[75]. 
242 See Walters, Giving Effect to Foreign Restructuring Plans, supra note 143 (identifying an unhelpful 
asymmetry in the UK’s approach to foreign discharges compared to that of the US). 
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preference for forms of coordination that use the tools of local insolvency law. British 
modified universalism as currently practiced thus finds expression in Articles 21(g) and 
23 of the CBIR.243 It grants the foreign representative access to relief that would be 
available to a British officeholder under local law without the need for a parallel 
proceeding. Conceivably, relief under Article 21(g) could be wider than relief available 
under the law of the foreign proceeding – a positive feature.244 The post-Rubin debate has 
focused mainly on the question of the extent to which UK law – especially the common 
law – permits local law to be used synthetically without following all of the locally 
applicable statutory formalities245 and rather less on the question of the applicability of 
foreign law.   
Westbrook’s premise is that the adoption of the Model Law represents the 
adoption of universalism in insolvency matters.246 He develops his argument in favor of a 
systemic interpretive rule by reference to Article 8 of the Model Law and comparable 
interpretive provisions in other international instruments. Article 8 – which is faithfully 
reproduced in the US and UK enactments – directs courts to have regard to the 
international origin of the Model Law and the need to promote uniformity in its 
application.  Westbrook argues that uniformity in interpretation is too narrow a goal 
because pragmatically he doubts “our [i.e. US] courts should follow whatever path has 
                                                        
243 In fairness to Professor Westbrook, I reiterate my concession in note 202 supra. This is not modified 
universalism as he would understand it. I suspect that he would characterize it as “modified territorialism.”  
244 In this respect, the CBIR authorizes relief that is more expansive than that available at common law. It is 
clear from Singularis that a court cannot exercise its common law powers of assistance to achieve ends that 
could not be achieved under the law of the foreign proceeding. See [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] A.C. 1675,  
245 One sticking point arises from the UK’s private international law rule that contractual obligations are 
only properly discharged under the law applicable to the contract. Following the rejection of Cambridge 
Gas in Rubin and Singularis it is not currently possible for a UK court to engineer a synthetic local law 
discharge as a means of implementing a foreign plan of reorganization. See Walters, Giving Effect to 
Foreign Restructuring Plans, supra note 143. 
246 Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, supra note 10, 742. In a footnote he identifies modified 
universalism as “[t]he most favored doctrine in the current era…which seeks to achieve steady pragmatic 
progress toward the ideal within the framework of existing political and technological possibilities.” 
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been laid down by courts in other countries, especially where we view that path as 
wrongheaded in the context of the international system that the instrument seeks to 
create.”247 So he would allow judges some leeway to depart from a system-oriented 
approach. Nevertheless, he proposes a broad “international interpretive rule” under which 
judges would interpret Model Law enactments in line with the goals of the international 
system of cross-border insolvency coordination that the Model Law attempts to establish 
and “consistent with the maximum cooperation and efficiency within an international 
matrix of courts applying the Model Law”.248 In pushing back against Rubin and Pan 
Ocean, Westbrook ushers us towards a modified universalist default principle that courts 
should presumptively give effect to the lex concursus (at very least – if I read him 
correctly − as regards the in rem effects of foreign plans of reorganization).   
To my mind, the argument overreaches. Westbrook acknowledges that 
UNCTRAL settled on a Model Law because a widely adopted international insolvency 
treaty would be difficult to achieve. He also acknowledges that Model Laws are products 
of compromise. And yet, his argument seems to boil down to the following. By adopting 
the Model Law, an enacting state is committing to an international system a core 
principle of which is modified universalism. Judges should behave as system-oriented, 
purpose governed, modified universalists and interpret Model Law texts accordingly. 
This way we can achieve what amounts to a back door convention by fashioning a default 
lex concursus rule out of the Model Law’s choice of forum COMI rule. Et voilà! 
Common unilateralism (countries choosing to enact the Model Law without insisting on 
                                                        
247 Id., 751. The same is true the other way around. It is worth noting that a really powerful role for Article 
8’s pursuit of harmonized interpretation would thoroughly Americanize the international insolvency system 
because the US is by far and away the largest producer of Model Law jurisprudence: see Section I.D., infra. 
248 Id., 754. 
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formal reciprocity) can be transformed into multilateral universalism sans convention. It 
is possible that I am over-reading. But even if Westbrook’s principle is merely intended 
to encourage UK judges to apply UK law synthetically across the board, appeals to the 
Model Law’s purpose(s) still meet the roadblock of long-established rules of private 
international law that have not been expressly displaced.  
My account of UK cross-border insolvency law in practice shows why I think 
Westbrook’s argument overreaches. For so long as the Model Law’s deliberate 
indeterminacy on choice-of-law is carried over into local enactments in countries that 
traditionally provide assistance under local law (as in the UK), it will tend to be self-
fulfilling – a kind of regression to the mean. Judges from such traditions can perfectly 
well say that they are doing their best to accomplish the goal of international cooperation 
by granting relief that would be available under local law. Article 8 directs courts to have 
regard to the Model Law’s international origin and the need to promote uniformity and 
therefore encourages them to engage with foreign law sources on Model Law 
enactments. But they are not bound by such sources (which is just as well given the 
variance in Model Law enactments).249  Judges can also legitimately say that general 
statutory language replete with noble cooperative sentiments 250  is no substitute for 
specific legislative commands or hard private international law rules; nor does it override 
the default structure of local cross-border insolvency law. Hence, modified universalism 
                                                        
249 In Pan Ocean, Morgan J. followed Article 8’s direction and took account, inter alia, of the Fifth 
Circuit’s Condor decision but declined to apply it principally because of differences in legislative history 
and manner in which the UK and US implemented the Model Law. See [2014] EWHC 2124 (Ch), [2014] 
Bus LR 1041, [93]-[108]. 
250 Such as those expressed in the Model Law’s preamble and reproduced in 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1). It is 
also worth noting that CBIR, art. 25(1) departs from the Model Law’s mandatory language in providing 
that “the court may cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts or foreign 
representatives…” (emphasis added). 
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as a principle or methodology gets stuck. It cannot do the work of a convention but 
apparently asks judges to approximate to a convention where there is none.  
Anglo-US experience demonstrates that modified universalism is not a unified 
phenomenon with a single set of characteristics or predicates. It varies across legal 
cultures in subtle ways that reproduce the compromise at the heart of the Model Law.251 
As the Model Law “system” is dominated by the US, the leading producer of Model Law 
jurisprudence, Westbrook’s interpretive principle just seems like an invitation to judges 
in other Model Law countries to subscribe to a strong, American version of modified 
universalism. “Glocal” judges are not guaranteed to accept such an exercise of American 
soft power,252 especially those judges who expect to see choice-of-law issues dealt with 
explicitly by convention or statute rather than by judicial rulemaking. 253  Thus a 
harmonizing interpretive principle, freighted with US jurisprudence under chapter 15, 
                                                        
251 On the self-reinforcing tendency of legislative compromise in a different context see Graeme 
Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright 
Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 737 (“As more recent efforts at intellectual property harmonization in the 
European Union…have demonstrated, achieving comprehensive unification of laws is extremely difficult 
in areas where divergent national jurisprudence has already taken root. And if unprincipled compromise is 
forced, either through political log-rolling or language consciously susceptible of all meanings to all 
parties, national courts steeped in different traditions may re-effect historical divergence.”). 
252 On the phenomenon of Americanization of transnational legal process through soft power see Benjamin 
Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, The Transnational Spread of American Law: Legalization as Soft Power, 
Inst. for Int’l L. and Just. (October 2010), http://www.iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Katzenstein-
The-Transnational-Spread-of-American-Law-2010.pdf. I acknowledge, of course, that the assertion of soft 
power by nations that have the clout and the desire to influence international standard setting will likely 
have real world effects. But I am skeptical that judges, particularly in the global north, will read the Model 
Law as a “system” text without further hard law guidance as to what such a system entails. 
253 See Lord Neuberger, The Supreme Court, the Privy Council and International Insolvency, text of a 
keynote speech at the International Insolvency Institute Annual Conference, London, June 19, 2017: 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170619.pdf  at [20] (…[I]n highly technical fields, and where 
cross-border issues are involved, judicial development of the law presents obvious difficulties, when 
compared with domestic and cross-border law-making by governments and legislators…I did not dissent in 
Singularis because I am a little Englander. Au contraire: I think that universalism is a noble aim, but I think 
it is normally better achieved by legislation and treaty-making; and at [26] (“The extent to which the Model 
Law promotes substantive universalism (i.e. the application of the law governing the foreign insolvency 
proceeding) appears to be answered differently in different jurisdictions. Thus, the US courts seem to have 
adopted a rather more universalist approach than the courts of the UK…Hopefully, this is another example 
of national inconsistencies which will encourage more international legislative action.”). 
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encounters resistance in other countries where local Model Law enactments reinforce 
local path dependencies. 
I should emphasize that my differences with Professor Westbrook are (I think) 
slight. I share his view that a “plain meaning” approach to statutory interpretation that 
ignores the purpose and structure of the statute can lead to unintended and unhelpful 
results.254 But in the present context, there is a question of integration and fit, i.e. how is 
the domestic Model Law enactment to be integrated within the existing corpus juris of 
the enacting state? Thus, Westbrook prioritizes the Model Law’s international origins and 
goals whereas my focus is on the natural limits of instruments that only acquire legal life 
through assimilation by domestic legal systems. 
 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL  
INSOLVENCY LAW  
 
Without either a preponderance of highly activist judges or local enactments that 
go beyond the Model Law’s soft “PIL-light” 255  approach, exhortations to courts to 
behave like American modified universalists and interpret their local Model Law 
enactments accordingly are not especially useful. This is not to decry the Model Law. On 
the contrary, I support its “less is more”256 orientation and believe that the professional 
international insolvency and restructuring community should continue to promote Model 
Law enactment and “know how” as one aspect of a multi-dimensional strategy involving 
international, regional and local lawmaking allied to an increased emphasis on network 
governance.   
                                                        
254 See Daniel Glosband & Jay L. Westbrook, Chapter 15 Recognition in the United States: Is a Debtor 
“Presence” Required?, 24 INT. INSOLV. REV. 28 (2015) and text to notes 189-194 supra. 
255 PIL here is an acronym for private international law. This description of the Model Law was coined in 
Block-Lieb & Halliday, Less is More, supra note 9. 
256 Id. 
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Divergence in transatlantic practice within the common law world reinforces the 
view that evolution of harmonized cross-border insolvency law frameworks towards 
greater universalism will depend on legislative incrementalism of the kind engaged in by 
UNCITRAL, involving recursive cycles of lawmaking and implementation that deepen 
and broaden the coverage of reform endeavors over time. 257  Recursivity is already 
evident in the work of UNCITRAL Working Group V on insolvencies of multinational 
enterprises and (in response to Rubin) on insolvency-related judgments.258  In similar 
vein, UNCITRAL has already touched on choice-of-law issues259  and there is every 
reason to suppose that the construction of an international choice-of-law rule-and-
exceptions architecture will feature squarely on UNCITRAL’s forward agenda.260 The 
balancing of interests involved in creating such an architecture is such that legislatures 
are institutionally better placed than courts to define the scope of a lex concursus rule and 
to consider the principled basis for appropriate exceptions dealing with such matters as 
security interests, set-off rights, labor contracts, and avoiding powers for which express 
provision is made in the EU Insolvency Regulation.261 A strong version of modified 
                                                        
257 See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Incrementalisms, supra note 9; Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, 
The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate 
Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007). 
258 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, A/CN.9/903, May 26, 2017, Report of Working Group V 
(Insolvency Law) on the work of its fifty-first session (New York, May 10-19, 2017). 
259 U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW,  
PARTS 1 & 2 (2004), 67-72 recommends that domestic legislatures should consider enacting a lex 
concursus choice-of-law rule with exceptions for financial markets, payment systems, and labor contracts. 
See also Gropper, Curious Disappearance, supra note 74, 160-63. 
260 Much current thinking is being directed to that end. See Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs, supra note 6; Clift, 
Choice of Law, supra note 26; Edward J. Janger, Silos: Establishing the Distributional Baseline in Cross-
Border Bankruptcies, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 180 (2014); Irit Mevorach, Cross-Border 
Insolvency of Enterprise Groups: The Choice of Law Challenge, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 226 
(2014). Choice-of-law harmonization has been a legislative priority at UNCITRAL for a few years. See 
U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, A/CN.9/798, January 8, 2014, Report of Working Group V 
(Insolvency Law) on the work of its forty-fourth session (Vienna, December 16-20, 2013), para 24. 
261 On the comparative advantage of legislatures in weighing competing (and possibly incommensurable) 
interests albeit in a different, domestic US context, see Mark D. Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role in 
 81 
universalism may well serve as a useful policy frame for this kind of legislative 
deliberation.262  But there needs to be an open, deliberative debate within international 
lawmaking fora, rather than buck passing to judges many of whom may (reasonably) be 
inclined to punt or (as in cases like Qimonda) to use statutory tools such as sufficient 
protection as a veiled mechanism for applying local law.   
Harder and deeper forms of international insolvency law are perhaps most likely 
to emerge successfully where they are layered onto, and integrated into, existing bilateral 
and multilateral frameworks for international and regional cooperation. The EU 
Insolvency Regulation and section 426 of the UK Insolvency Act provide good examples 
of such an approach. Layering does not treat international insolvency cooperation as 
discrete but instead involves the construction of unified approaches to private 
international law on the foundations of pre-existing forms of cooperative ordering. The 
Insolvency Regulation added a comprehensive scheme of harmonized private 
international rules to the EU’s existing commitments to judicial cooperation in civil 
matters, powerfully underpinned by norms of mutual recognition and trust. These norms 
flow from the EU’s supranational legal ordering and reflect the breadth and depth of 
regional economic, legal, and political integration that the EU has accomplished since 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Determining What Full Faith and Credit Requires: An Additional Argument, 41 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 7 
(2010). 
262 See Pottow, Beyond Carve-Outs, supra note 6 (proposing modified universalism as a second-order 
choice of law theory); IRIT MEVORACH, THE FUTURE OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: 
OVERCOMING BIASES AND CLOSING GAPS (2018) (arguing that modified universalism promotes a 
global approach to cross-border insolvencies that is flexible and capable of adjustment to real world 
conditions in different transnational settings rather than “one size fits all”.). On a separate note, increasing 
convergence among corporate bankruptcy laws influenced by international and supranational institutions 
may, over time, reduce the salience of conflict of laws and choice-of-law problems. 
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1957.263 Similar orderings may conceivably arise through bilateral or multilateral trade 
treaties that could over time (as EU experience has shown) yield mutual recognition 
frameworks. Section 426 arises from historic family relationships between the UK, its 
overseas territories and former colonies. It amounts to a lattice of bilateral commitments 
arrived at by the executive on the basis of a norm of reciprocity and endorsed by the 
legislature through a system of favored nation accreditation. In similar vein, US-
Canadian judicial cooperation has gone much deeper than US-UK cooperation. US 
judges in New York and Delaware and Canadian judges in Toronto are accustomed to 
coordinating the cross-border insolvency cases that arise from geographical proximity 
against the background of wider frameworks for regional cooperation (NAFTA).264 Of 
course, this will leave gaps outside of such frameworks, a point underscored by the poor 
relation status of the UK’s “third country” cross-border insolvency regime. But Rome 
wasn’t built in a day.  
This is not to say that judges do not have a role to play in creative interpretation 
and in improving coordination pending further cycles of international and local 
legislative intervention. They can develop cross-border insolvency law interstitially 
having regard both to international and domestic law (albeit this will have variable results 
depending on the manner in which the Model Law is enacted and received into different 
legal systems and cultures). This may produce some overreaching (cases like Cambridge 
Gas) and some under-reaching (cases like Rubin) but judicial overreaching and under-
                                                        
263 The UK’s impending departure from the EU does not detract from the basic point that the EU has 
created strong norms of mutual recognition based on a treaty foundation institutionally reinforced by the 
Court of Justice. 
264 The depth of US-Canadian cooperation in cross-border insolvencies is such that Canadian and US courts 
have held joint hearings. See Lauren L. Peacock, A Tale of Two Courts: The Novel Cross-Border 
Bankruptcy Trial, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L.R. 543 (2015). Regional cooperation has a long history. For 
other examples, see REINHARD BORK, PRINCIPLES OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW, 8-9 
(2017). 
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reaching can be useful in helping to set forward legislative agendas, UNCITRAL’s 
response to Rubin being a case in point.  
Moreover, while the legislative wheels grind slowly forward, judges can establish 
and develop mechanisms for network governance that will lead to more effective 
transnational coordination of cases in line with the Model Law’s goal of fostering court-
to-court communication. 265  Indeed, meaningful attempts at developing common 
procedural rules and protocols for case managing complex multinational insolvencies and 
encouraging communication and cooperation between courts have already been made.266  
The recently established Judicial Insolvency Network (“JIN”), instigated by the 
Chief Justice of the Singapore Supreme Court,267 represents the latest advance in network 
governance. Initially comprising judges from Australia, Bermuda, the BVI, Canada, the 
Cayman Islands, England & Wales, Singapore, and the US, and with observers 
participating from other countries, JIN produced guidelines in 2016 that have 
subsequently been adopted as local rules by courts in Delaware, New York, Florida, 
                                                        
265 On the role of judges and regulators in transgovernmental networks see, e.g. Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L. L. 1103 (2000) and A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. 
INT’L. L.J. 191 (2003); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L. L. 1 (2002). For discussion of network 
governance and transnational judicial dialogue in the specific context of international insolvency 
cooperation see GLOBAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at 38-9. 
266 GLOBAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 3; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION 
AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES (2003); EUROPEAN COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION 
GUIDELINES FOR CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY (2007); JUDICIAL INSOLVENCY NETWORK, 
GUIDELINES FOR COMMUNICATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN COURTS IN CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY MATTERS (2016). 
267 Singapore is setting out its stall with a view to becoming the leading Asian restructuring hub. As well as 
the JIN initiative, its courts are showing some willingness to branch out and differentiate Singaporean 
cross-border insolvency law from its UK counterpart in the context of a spate of legislative reform. See In 
re Pacific Andes Resources Development Ltd, [2016] SGHC 210, signaling, at [46]-[52], Singapore’s 
willingness to depart from the English rule that debts can only be discharged in accordance with the 
governing law of the contract. Singapore has also established a specialist international commercial court. 
See Andrew Godwin et al, International Commercial Courts: The Singapore Experience, 18(2) 
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1 (2017). 
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Bermuda, England and Wales, New South Wales and Singapore.268 The JIN Guidelines 
provide for the incorporation of protocols into court orders where there are parallel 
proceedings affecting a debtor company or group. They draw on existing judicial 
experience in cases such as Nortel to provide open-ended “soft” case guidelines 
(including the possibility of innovative practices such as joint hearings). They do not 
interfere with each court’s jurisdiction or affect substantive rights but they do create a 
methodology for identifying conflicts and determining the sequence in which issues 
should be resolved with each court being aware of what other courts are doing. The 
phenomenon of international judicial negotiation269  is not new but in the insolvency 
context it is under-studied. Transnational procedural approaches usefully supplement and 
flesh out the cooperative mandate of instruments like the Model Law. Moreover, subject 
to standard caveats about accountability of unelected judicial actors and cross-cultural 
sensitivities, it makes sense for the frontline actors who have direct experience of 
cooperation and coordination in practice to lead on developing transnational procedural 
and case management approaches.270 Insofar as transnational case sequencing helps to 
avoid costly and time consuming jurisdictional conflicts, it serves goals such as judicial 
economy in which judges are invested. Institutionalized interactions of the sort promoted 
by JIN and the INSOL Judicial Colloquium will continue to be significant in building 
trust and in creating the infrastructure of the emerging international forum shopping 
                                                        
268 See http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Chapter15Guidelines.pdf  
269 See Jay L. Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiation, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 567 (2003). 
270 See Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Cutting the Cloth to Fit the Dispute: Steps Towards Better Procedures 
Across Jurisdictions (Singapore Academy of Law Annual Lecture 2016), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/lcj-speech-singapore-academy-of-law.pdf  
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system in which cases are allocated primarily according to majority creditor 
preference.271 
While I understand American universalist attempts to use the Model Law, and 
modified universalism, to nudge towards a global lex concursus rule, my article shows 
that differences in implementation and reception of the Model Law reveal different 
understandings of modified universalism. These different understandings are not radically 
divergent. But they do undermine the practical utility of modified universalism as a 
source of guidance for judges exercising discretionary powers under Model Law 
enactments. My article serves also (I hope) as a call to international insolvency scholars 
to shift even more of our collective focus towards the processes and institutions that 
contribute to the making of international insolvency law. 
                                                        
271 See, e.g. In re Suntech Power Holdings Co., 520 B.R. 399 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (debtor with creditor 
support choosing to restructure in the Cayman Islands rather than China). 
